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Real to Reel: The Hirsch Case and First
Amendment Protection for Film-makers'
Confidential Sources of Information

STEPHEN F. ROHDE*

INTRODUCTION

Karen Silkwood, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Lee Harvey
Oswald, Caryl Chessman, Don Bolles, Senator Joseph McCarthy, Joan Little, Melvin Dummar, Frances Gary Powers, Karen
Ann Quinlan, Elizabeth Ray, Joseph Yablonski, Gary Thomas
Rowe, Jr., Jack Ruby, John Dean and Gary Gilmore all are
famous and notorious people who have shared headlines across
the world and have figured, in one way or another, in the current American experience.
This, however, is no arbitrary list. In the last year, major
©
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motion picture and television productions have been mounted
to re-enact, in dramatic and documentary formats, the lives and
deaths of these public figures.1
Whether or not all these productions are ever released and
broadcast, it is plain that the coverage of the news events which
have surrounded these individuals and which will surround
others will no longer be confined to the daily newspaper or the
nightly news program. Screenwriters and motion picture producers 2 are vigorously attempting to engage the attention of
movie-goers and TV audiences with factual re-enactments of
historical and current events. Previously such material was
confined to "fictionalizations" which, by relying upon "dramatic license," may well have misled more than enlightened.
This current development provides the setting in which to

explore an important Federal appellate decision which guaranteed that film-makers who use motion pictures for investigative
reporting can gather sensitive and explosive information with
the confithe assurance that, absent compelling circumstances,
3
dentiality of their sources will be protected.
1. Karen Silkwood (a major documentary dramatizing the life and mysterious death of this "nuclear dissenter" will be produced by Buzz Hirsch, Larry
Cano, and Carlos Anderson); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (King, produced by
Abbey Mann for NBC); Lee Harvey Oswald (The Trial of Lee Harvey Oswald,
produced by Chuck Fries Productions and broadcast by ABC on September 30
and October 2,1977); Caryl Chessman (Kill Me if You Can, broadcast by NBC
on September 25, 1977); Don Bolles (a major motion picture on the murder of
this Phoenix investigative reporter is being planned by Brut Productions for
CBS in conjunction with New West magazine writer John Nugent); Senator
Joseph McCarthy (TailgunnerJoe, broadcast by NBC and winner of an Emmy
award from the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences for "outstanding
writing in a special program, drama or comedy"); Joan Little (the story of this
southern convict who stabbed her jailer to death is being planned by Universal
Studios); Melvin Dummar (Mike Nichols will direct and Bo Goldman will write
this motion picture for Universal Studios about the Utah service station owner
named in the disputed Howard Hughes "Mormon Will"); Frances Gary Powers
(Frances Gary Powers: The True Story of the U2 Spy Incident, broadcast by
NBC); Karen Ann Quinlan (In the Matter of Karen Ann Quinlan, broadcast in
September, 1977 by NBC); Elizabeth Ray (possible motion picture based on her
book THE WASHINGTON FRINGE BENEFIT); Joseph A. Yablonski (a major motion
picture to be directed by William Friedkin and written by Jeremy Larner for
Warner Bros.); Gary Thomas Rowe Jr. (My UndercoverYears with the Ku Klux
Klan, the true story of an FBI agent's infiltration of the Klan and witnessing of
the slaying of civil rights worker Viola Liuzza is being produced by NBC); Jack
Ruby (Ruby and Oswald to be produced by Alan Landsberg for CBS); John
Dean (a television adaptation of his book Blind Ambition is planned for CBS);
and Gary Gilmore (television producer Larry Schiller is planning a 6 hour TV
film reaching back several generations in the Gilmore family).
2. The docu-drama format has also had limited exposure on the stage from
the highly fictionalized Trial of the Catonsville 9 to Sirhan and R.F.K.-A
Murder Mystery, written by Hans Steinkellner from trial testimony and public
records.
3. Some related legal questions worthy of full length articles are: a)
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In September, 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, in Karen G. Silkwood, et al. v. The KerrMcGee Corporation,et al. v. Arthur Buzz Hirsch4 upheld the

right of Buzz Hirsch to refuse on First Amendment grounds to
disclose confidential sources of information gathered while preparing, a documentary motion picture depicting the life and
death of Karen Silkwood, unless the party seeking disclosure
could overcome a heavy burden of showing that the specific
whether historical figures and their heirs have a right to restrict and control the
depiction of their famous lives. See Guglielmi v. Spelling Goldberg Productions,
73 Cal. App. 3d 436, 140 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977) (Hg. granted Nov. 17, 1977 L.A.
30872) (denying the heir of silent screen star Rudolph Valentino a claim on the
commercial value of his famous uncle's image); Lugosi v. Universal Studios,
Inc., 70 Cal. App. 3d 552, 139 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1977) (the California Supreme Court
has granted a petition for hearing in this case following a court of appeals
decision denying the heirs of Bella Lugosi a right to participate in the benefits
derived from the commercial exploitation of Lugosi's portrayal of Count Dracula Hg. granted Aug. 11, 1977 (L.A. 30824)); b) whether the re-enactment of a
historical event, while litigation surrounding that event is pending, can expose a
producer to liability. (After announcing that it intended to produce a "theatre of
fact" drama about the 1972 Buffalo Creek Dam disaster which killed 125 people
in West Virginia, NBC dropped the project after spending over $500,000 because
of concern that it might influence pending lawsuits involving the same incident
and because of a series of alleged errors in the proposed script. The future of
other properties optioned by NBC for potential docu-dramas is uncertain.
BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, November 7, 1977 at 36; c) whether legislation enacted
in New York and proposed in California and in Congress, prohibiting an accused criminal from earning royalties from books, motion picture rights and
television interviews relating to his alleged crime(s), is unconstitutional as a
denial of free speech, a taking of property without just compensation, cruel and
unusual punishment or an unlawful assumption that a suspect is guilty until
proven innocent. Phil Kerby, Making Crime Pay: Sick Business Los Angeles
Times, August 18, 1977, part II, page 1; editorial, Cutting Sin's Profits Los
Angeles Times, October 5, 1977, part II, page 6; d) whether exposure to television
dramas depicting real or imagined violence is either a defense to murder or
grounds for a civil suit by the victim or his heirs against the broadcaster. On
October 6, 1977 Ronny Zamora was convicted of first degree murder notwithstanding the defense contention that he had been driven temporarily insane by
television violence, BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, October 10, 1977, page 32. Also,
the California Court of Appeals has ordered NBC to stand trial on a $22 million
civil damage suit claiming that the nationally televised film "Born Innocent,"
depicting the artificial rape of a teen age girl with a bottle, caused a group of
teenagers in 1974 to commit a similar act on the plaintiff's minor daughter. The
trial court had viewed the motion picture at the outset of the jury trial, found
that it did not advocate or encourage violent or depraved acts and thus did not
constitute an incitement, and therefore dismissed the case on First Amendment
grounds. Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Company, 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141
Cal. Rptr. 511 (1977).
4. 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (hereinafter referred to as the Hirsch decision).

information sought went to the "heart of the case", and that
attempts to obtain the information elsewhere had been unsuccessful. In so ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the United States Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
and for the first time placed film-makers such as Hirsch on a
par with newspaper and broadcast journalists.
As the latest federal decision dealing with the tangled question of protection of confidential sources, the Hirsch case calls
for a review of the need for such protection in all fields of
journalism and for a look at the inadequate and inconsistent
manner in which Congress and state legislatures have dealt
with this problem.
This article will explore the following topics:
A. The vital First Amendment interest in the protection of
journalists' confidential sources in all media.
B. The prior court decisions dealing with the protection of
confidential sources.
C. State legislation and proposed federal statutes affecting
confidential sources.
D. An analysis of the Hirsch decision.
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS'
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES IN ALL MEDIA

There has never been any serious debate that the ability to
gather information upon a pledge of confidentiality is critical to
the goal of insuring a free flow of information to the public. The
plurality opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes5 acknowledged that it
was not suggesting that "news gathering does not qualify for
first amendment protection. ' 6 Justice Powell's concurring opinion, which was necessary to create a majority, noted that the
Supreme Court "does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights
with respect to the gathering of news or safeguarding their
sources."7 In his dissent, Justice Stewart viewed the right to
gather news as the cornerstone of freedom of the press, for if
news is cut off at its source there is no free flow of information
to the public. 8
Working journalists have repeatedly emphasized that protec5. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

6. Id. at 681.
7. Id. at 709.

8. Id. at 728.
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tion of confidential sources is vital if journalists are to perform
their job effectively. Walter Cronkite of CBS News has written:
"The fact is that there are few working journalists who believe
that freedom of the press, and hence democracy itself, can en-

dure if newsmen are unable to protect their sources." 9 John
Chancellor of NBC News has written: "For the press to be truly
free, it must be free to pursue the truth whenever it finds it, and
that includes the freedom to honor its pledge of confidence

without fear of legal interference."' 10
With laudible assuredness, the American Newspaper Guild
has included in its Code of Ethics the unqualified command that
9. Letter to California Assemblyman Jerry Lewis dated April 5, 1977. Mr.
Cronkite elaborated as follows:
A newsman in almost all cases is able to reveal perfidy, malfeasance and
misfeasance, corruption and venality on the part of public officials only
with the help of an honest employee privy to the secrets within. If such
sources cannot be guaranteed confidentiality, clearly they cannot be
cooperative, and the more corrupt the regime the greater the danger to
them of exposure.
The truth is so apparent to the working journalist that it beggars his
understanding as to why others cannot see. Why can't the American
people see that the freedom of the press is not some privilege extended
to a favored segment of the population but is purely and simply their
own right to be told what their government and their servants are doing
in their name?
The press cannot do that job unless it is free to protect its sources. It is as
simple as that.
10. Letter to Assemblyman Lewis, dated March 29, 1977. Mr. Chancellor
also stated that:
I am concerned about these developments, not only because I am a
journalist, but also because I believe that the flow of information we all
need as citizens is becoming restricted. The extent of the problem is
hard to measure because those who have aided newsmen at personal
risk are not likely to volunteer to recount their experiences before
committees such as this one. I can state from my own experience that I
know of many worthwhile stories which could not have been reported if
our sources had not entrusted us to preserve their anonymity and confidentiality. There are, nevertheless, many cases where people need the
assurance of confidentiality. The reasons vary as much as people and
news items. Family, career, and business relationships, friendships,
hatred, fear of retribution by criminals-or bosses-all can be motives.
In these cases, the public may never hear their stories unless they can be
sure that their identities will not be betrayed.
Mr. Chancellor related that had Judge Sirica's gag order in the Watergate case
been strictly adhered to, the press would have been relegated to repeating the
official story that the burglars acted alone, seeking evidence that the Soviet
Union had made contributions to presidential candidate George McGovern's
campaign in exchange for his promise to recognize communist Cuba. "Had
members of the press-and their informants-adhered strictly to Judge Sirica's
order, development of the Watergate story could have been seriously hindered,
and history could have taken a different turn."

"Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose
sources of confidential information in court or before other
judicial investigating bodies."'1
It is surprising then that the concededly valid proposition that
confidential sources of information are vital to a free press has
resulted in such a wide diversity of legal opinion and legislative
enactment and remains unresolved before the United States
Supreme Court, the United States Congress and state legislatures.
Any First Amendment privilege against compulsory disclosure of confidential information must protect persons and organizations who obtain such information in the process of disseminating it to the public, regardlessof the particularmedium
involved, whether it be books, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, broadcasts or motion pictures. It has long been held that:
"The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals ....
The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of infor12
mation and opinion.'
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press "are not
for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us.
A broadly defined freedom of the press assures
the mainte13
nance of our political system and open society."'
Any grudgingly narrow conception of the "press" is inconsistent with the fundamental doctrine "that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public-that a free
press is a condition to a free society."' 4 "Freedom of the press
was not guaranteed solely to shield persons engaged in newspaper work from unwarranted governmental harassment. The
lar15
ger purpose was to protect public access to information.'
In considering the First Amendment goal of producing an
informed public capable of conducting its own affairs, 6 "it is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters which is paramount ....
It is the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and
7
other ideas and experiences which is crucial here."'
11. G. BIRD AND F. MERWIN, THtE PRESS AND SocIETY 592 (1971).

12. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1935). See also Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943); Mills v. State of Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
219 (1966).
13. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
14. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944).
15. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1972).
16. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
17. Id. at 390.
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Since it is the public's right to know which is at the core of the
First Amendment, it is immaterial for constitutional purposes
whether the public receives its information from newspapers,
books, television, motion pictures, pamphlets or other forms of
expression. It is beyond question that the First Amendment is
applicable to motion pictures. 18 The fact that a motion picture

may be entertaining while at the same time informative is of no
constitutional import because "the line between the informing
and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of ...
(freedom of the press)."19
Nor does the fact that the public is informed by means of a

reenactment of real life events disqualify such expression from
First Amendment protection. In Time, Inc. v. Hill,20 the Court

accorded First Amendment protection in a civil invasion of
privacy case to a magazine article which contained photographs
of actors portraying characters in the Broadway play The Desperate Hours based upon the real-life experiences of the Hill

family. The Court recognized that such a dramatization was
squarely within the scope of the First Amendment.
It is also well settled that because books, newspapers, magazines or motion pictures are exploited for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression safeguarded by the
21
First Amendment.
18. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Erzonzuik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975). In Burstyn, the Court held that "It cannot be doubted that motion
pictures are a significant medium for the comunication of ideas. They may
affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct
espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which
characterizes all artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures as an
organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to
entertain, as well as to inform." 343 U.S. 495, 501.
19. Winters v. People of the State of New York, 333 U.S. 507,510 (1948). Most
recently, the Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcastingCo.,
97 S. Ct. 2849 (1977) held that "There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as
news, enjoys First Amendment protection. It is also true that entertainment
itself can be important news, Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra." Id. at 4958. Unfortunately, the result in Zacchini, which upheld a cause of action by a performer
known as "The Human Cannonball" against a television station for broadcasting a 15-second news clip of his performance, did not serve to enforce the First
Amendment doctrine expressed in the opinion.
20. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
21. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 501-02; Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingsboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).

Finally, although many of the cases in this field deal with
"news",there is no support for the proposition that only "news"
is protected by the First Amendment. "No suggestion can be
found in the Constitution that the freedom there granted for
speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness
'22
and importance of the ideas seeking expression.
Given the overwhelming impact of motion pictures, in
comparison to the audiences which are reached by newspapers
and magazines it is imperative for constitutional protection to
23

keep pace.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the audience potential
for motion pictures re-enacting current historical events is All
the President'sMen, released in 1976 by Warner Bros. Originally a series of investigative news stories in the Washington
Post by Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, and later a best
selling book, the motion picture, All the President'sMen, has
22. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941); See also Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). For example, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the magazine
article at stake dramatized events which had occurred more than two and a half
years earlier.
23. In 1977, there were 135,000,000 TV sets in use in the United States. This
represents 32.7% of the more than 413,207,000 TV sets in use throughout the
world. The ten nations with the largest number of TV sets in use in 1977 were:
United States (135,000,000), USSR (50,000,000), United Kingdom (26,500,000), Japan (26,000,000), West Germany (19,000,000), France (14,200,000), Italy
(12,805,000), Canada (9,900,000), Brazil (9,000,000), and Spain (6,500,000). TELEVISION/RADIO AGE INTERNATIONAL,

November, 1977, pp. A-52 to A-54.

In the United States, the annual theatrical audience for all motion pictures is
one billion people, while the annual foreign theatrical audience is 2.6 billion
people (statistics compiled by the Motion Picture Association of American
(MPAA) Research Department, as of 1977).
In comparison, the largest newspaper in the United States, The New York
Daily News, has a daily circulation of less than 2 million readers and the top ten
newspapers in the United States combined have a daily readership of less than
10 million people. New York Daily News, 1,902,717; Wall Street Journal, 1,465,
633; Los Angeles Times, 1,400,718; New York Times, 841,476; Chicago Tribune
747,715; Spokane Chronicle, 641,841; Detroit News, 627,461,; Detroit Free Press,
622,339, Chicago Sun Times, 560,124; Philadelphia Bulletin, 554,381. THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, 428-29 (1977).
Two examples of theatrical and television motion pictures re-enacting current events demonstrate the overwhelming ability to reach audiences through
these media. In 1977, NBC broadcast Raid on Entebbe, a dramatic re-enactment
of the incredible rescue by the Israeli Air Force. It was seen in an estimated
8,200,000 American households by approximately 24,108,000 viewers. (Generally
speaking, the television industry assumes that the average number of persons
per household is 2.94.) (A.C. Nielson & Co. figures compiled by the MPAA
Research Department). In 1974, Paramount Pictures released Serpico, the true
story of corruption in the New York City Police Department. It was seen by 10
million theatergoers in the United States and another 16 million people
worldwide, followed by a television network broadcast to 9,300,000 households.
The estimate of the total number of people who have seen Serpico on television
and in theatres is 53,342,000. (Theatrical admissions compiled by the MPAA
Research Department and television figures provided by A.C. Nielson & Co.).
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been seen by at least 50,000,000 movie-goers throughout the
24
world.
The example of All the President'sMen is instructive. For
constitutional purposes, it makes no difference that the investigative research accomplished by Woodward and Bernstein
was first published in a newspaper, later included in a book and
ultimately dramatized by actors Robert Redford and Dustin
Hoffman in the motion picture. Surely Woodward and Bernstein did not lose their First Amendment rights by having their
work re-enacted in a motion picture. Likewise, had they chosen
at the outset to disseminate their research by means-of a motion
picture, they would have been protected by the first amendment
from divulging their confidential information for ultimate dissemination to the public.
A.

The FirstAmendment Restricts Compulsory Testimony in
all Proceedings, Whether Criminal or Civil, Judicial or
Legislative

It is a constitutional doctrine of cardinal importance that all
proceedings involving compulsory testimony must avoid
abridgments of the First Amendment. "It is particularly important that the exercise of the power of compulsory process be
carefully circumscribed when the investigative process tends to
impinge upon such highly sensitive areas as freedom of speech
or press, freedom of political association, and freedom of
' '25
communication of ideas.
The Supreme Court has ruled that "the Bill of Rights is appli'26
cable to investigations as to all forms of governmental action.
Thus, the Supreme Court has prevented abridgments of the
First Amendment in congressional investigations 27 and in state
28
legislative investigations.
24. Theatrical figures compiled by the MPAA Research Department indicate Estimated Motion Picture Theatre Admissions of at least 20,000,000 people
in the United States and 30,000,000 people in the rest of the world. "All the
President's Men" has not yet been shown on network television where it is likely
to garner over 10,000,000 households for an additional 30,000,000 viewers.
25. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957).
26. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957).
27. Id. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749,773 (1962) (concurring opinion).
The majority decision was based upon the criminal procedure grounds for
testing the-sufficiency of the indictment.
28. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539
(1962).

To further the purposes of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has broadly construed the freedoms of speech and
press to include the right to publish, 29 the right to distribute,3 0
the right to circulate, 3 1 and the right to receive information.3 2
Decisions made by an informed citizenry are the very cornerstone upon which a free society is based and a free press is
indispensable to an informed citizenry. The press "has been a
mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in government affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees
and generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences . . . . "33 Since the First Amendment protects the free
flow of information to the public, such information would
necessarily be restricted if no protection whatsoever were afforded to the process by which such information is gathered.It
is essential that any attempt sanctioned by the Government to
thwart that process must be justified by extraordinary circum34
stances and vital national purposes.
This is not to say that merely by waving the First Amendment
all judicial and legislative inquiries must give way, regardless of
the circumstances involved, but it is equally untenable to suggest that once having asserted a desire for evidence, First
Amendment rights must automatically fall by the wayside.
Thus, in Watkins v. United States,3 5 notwithstanding the
"broad" congressional power of investigation, the Supreme
Court held that such an investigation "is subject to the
command that the Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or press or assembly .... The First Amendment
may be invoked against infringement of the protected freedoms
by law or by lawmaking. '36 And the Court recognized that the
"accommodation of the congressional need for particular information with the individual and personal interest in privacy is an
'37
arduous and delicate task for any court.
Likewise, in

Gibson v. Florida Legislature Investigation

29. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
30. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
31. Grosjeans v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
32. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
33. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
34. "When governmental activity collides with First Amendment rights, the
government has the burden of establishing that its interests are legitimate and
compelling and that the incidental infringement upon First Amendment rights
is no greater than is essential to vindicate its subordinating interest." (Citations
omitted.) Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1083 (9th Cir. 1972).
35. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

36. Id. at 197.
37. Id. at 198.
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Committee,3 8 the Supreme Court acknowledged that "there can
be no question that the State has power adequately to inform
itself-through legislative investigation, if it so desires-in order
to act and protect its legitimate and vital interests. 3 9 But notwithstanding such a power, the First Amendment freedoms
require that, "Step by step or in totality, an adequate foundation
for inquiry must be laid before proceeding in such a manner as
will substantially intrude upon and severely curtail or inhibit
interfere with
constitutionally protected activities or seriously
40
similarly protected associational rights.
It is in this setting then that the decision in Branzburg v.
Hayes4 1 must be viewed. In Branzburg five justices favored the
fair and effective functioning of a grand jury investigation over
any risk of abridging the First Amendment by compelling journalists to divulge confidential information regarding criminal
activity.
The plurality opinion of Mr. Justice White repeatedly limited
its scope and application. At the outset, the plurality states that:
"The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation into the commission
'42
of crime.
Time and again the plurality emphasizes that it is "fair and
effective law enforcement" and "the public interest in pursuing
and prosecuting those crimes reported to the press by-informants and in thus deterring the commission of such crimes in
the future, ' 43 which justifies compulsory testimony by journalists regarding their confidential sources.
The plurality derides the idea that a desire to escape criminal
prosecution is deserving of constitutional protection, and notes
that "it is obvious that agreements to conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them
from the standpoint of public policy.""
38. 372 U.S. 539 (1962).
39.
40.
41.
42.
Justice
43.
44.

Id. at 544.
Id. at 557
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Id. at 682. Also see text accompanying note 7, supra,for a discussion of
Powell's concurring opinion.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.

However, the plurality is quick to note that a rule compelling
journalists to testify in grand jury proceedings investigating
crimes of which the journalists have knowledge and information, sets no precedent with regard to other proceedings not
involving the investigation of criminal activity.
Only where news sources themselves are implicated in crime or
possess information relevant to the grand jury's task need they or the
reporter be concerned about grand jury subpoenas. Nothing before us
indicates that a large number or percentage of all confidential news

sources falls into either category and would in any way be deterred by
our holding that the Constitution does not, as it never has, exempt the
newsman from performing the citizen's normal duty of appearing
and
45
furnishing information relevant to the grand jury's task.

As noted, the limited nature of the plurality's decision was
necessary for Mr. Justice Powell to join in the majority. He
reassured the press that "no harassment of newsmen will be
tolerated. If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith he is not without remedy."' 48 He concluded that "in short, the courts will be available to
newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First Amend'
ment interests require protection."47
Mr. Justice Powell expanded on his interpretation of Bransburg in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. ,48 where he wrote that "a
fair reading of the majority's analysis in Branzburg makes
plain that the result hinged on an assessment of the competing
societal interest involved in that case rather than on any determination that First Amendment freedoms were not implicated.

'49

No one can fairly read the plurality and concurring opinions
in Branzburg without acknowledging that far from rejecting a
journalist's privilege against compulsory disclosure of confidential information in all proceedings and in all circumstances,
Branzburg exemplifies the arduous and delicate task of accommodating the First Amendment with the requirements of
compulsory testimony. The fact that the "fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property of
the citizen" outweighed the First Amendment, "on the records
now before" the Court,50 does not mean that the balance should
45. Id. at 691. "The obligation to testify in response to grand jury subpoenas
will not threaten those sources not involved with criminal conduct and without
information relevant to grand jury investigations. . ....
46. 408 U.S. 709, 710.
47. Id. at 699.
48. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
49. Id. at 859-60.

50. 408 U.S. at 690.
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not be struck in favor of freedom of the press in other circumstances and in other proceedings.5 1
B.

The First Amendment, Affords a Privilege to a Non-party
Witness During Pre-Trial Discovery in Civil Actions to
Protect Confidential Sources of Information

There is a mounting series of court decisions and wide support in scholarly commentaries upholding the doctrine that in
pre-trial civil litigation a non-party journalist is entitled to a
qualified privilege against compulsory disclosure of confidential information which is lost only after the party seeking disclosure has proven that the information sought is (a) "clearly relevant" and "essential" to the underlying litigation; (b) not available from any alternative sources and (c) not so broad or wideranging as to constitute an undue burden on the non-party
witness.
1. Case Law
The "Saturday Evening Post" Case.
In Baker v. F & F Investment,52 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld a District Court decision refusing to
compel a journalist to disclose confidential news sources. In
that case, a New York journalist, Alfred Balk, refused to identify an anonymous real estate agent who was the source for a
Saturday Evening Post article written ten years earlier about
racial discrimination. He was deposed by the plaintiffs in a civil
rights class action alleging the existence of "blockbusting" and
other racially discriminatory practices in Chicago.
The Court immediately recognized that the existence of state
statutes in New York and Illinois 53 protecting news sources "reflect(s) a paramount public interest in the maintenance of a
vigorous, aggressive and independent press capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters,
51. Commentators have noted the "balancing" approach implicit in the
plurality opinion in Branzburg.See: The Right of The Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 179, 180 (1975); Murasky,
The Journalist'sPrivilege: Branzburg And Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829,
877, 878 (1974).
52. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
53. Comparable statutes exist in 18 states; see note 133.

always been a principal concern of the
an interest which has
'54
First Amendment.

The Court found that:
Compelled disclosure of confidential sources unquestionably
threatens a journalist's ability to secure information that is made
available. to him only on a confidential basis-and the District Court
so found. The deterrent effect such disclosure is likely to have upon
future "undercover" 'investigative reporting, the dividends of which
are revealed in articles such as Balk's, threatens freedom of the press

and the public's need to be informed. It thereby undermines values
been protected by federal courts applying
which traditionally have
55
federal public policy.

The Court rejected the view that any overriding importance

of compelling testimony in judicial proceedings was sufficient
to outweigh the First Amendment.
While we recognize that there are cases-few in number to be surewhere First Amendment rights must yield, we are still mindful of the
preferred position which the First Amendment occupies in the pantheon of freedoms. Accordingly, though a journalist's right to protecf
confidential sources may not take precedence over that rare overriding and compelling interest, we are of the view that there are circumstances, at the very least in civil cases, in which the public interest in
nondisclosure of a journalist's confidential sources outweighs the
us
public and private interest in compelled testimony. The case before
56
is one where the First Amendment protection must not yield.

The Court found that neither Garlandv. Torre,5 7 nor Branzburg controlled the result reached in this case.
As to Garland,the Court found that whereas there the party
seeking disclosure had taken "active steps independently to determine the identity of the confidential news source,"5 8 in Baker

there were other available sources of information that might
have disclosed the true identity of the informant which the
moving parties had not exhausted. And, whereas in Garland,
having exhausted all other sources, the identity of the defend-

ant's 'source became "essential to the libel action (and) went to
of the plaintiff's claim," in Baker neither was the
the heart
59
case.
As to Branzburg, the Court in Baker found it "only of tangential relevance to this case," since it dealt solely with grand jury
54. 470 F.2d at 782.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
57. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
58. 570 F.2d at 783-84.
59. The Court in Garlandmade it clear that its holding was strictly limited
to the facts of the case and proceeded to explain that it was "not dealing with use
of the judicial process to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confidential sources of news, nor with a case where the identity of the news source is
of doubtful relevance or materiality." 259 F.2d 545, 549-50.
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subpoenas and 0no such "criminal overtones color the facts in
6
this civil case.
The Court concluded its decision in the following words:
It is axiomatic, and a principle fundamental to our constitutional
way of life, that where the press remains free so too will the people
remain free. Freedom of the press may be stifled by direct or, more
subtly, by indirect restraints. Happily, the First Amendment tolerates
neither, absent a concern so compelling as to override the precious
rights of freedom of speech and the press. We find no such compelling
concern in this case. Accordingly it is our view that the District Court
properly exercised its discretion in refusing to order Mr. Balk to
disclose the identity of his journalistic source.61

The "Life Magazine" Case.
In Cervantes v. Time, Inc. ,62 the Mayor of St. Louis, Missouri
filed a libel action against Life magazine and the reporter
whose investigative efforts produced the allegedly defamatory
article. The Mayor deposed the reporter who testified that he
gathered information from informants within the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the United States Department of
Justice, the identity of which he refused to divulge. The Mayor
moved for an order to compel discovery of the identity of the
informants. The defendants responded by moving for summary
judgment on the ground that each had acted without actual
"imalice."
The District Court did not reach the merits of the motion to
compel, but, on the basis of a well-developed record entered
summary judgment for the defendants. The Mayor urged on
appeal that he could not possibly meet his burden of proof if the
reporter was allowed to hide behind anonymous news sources,
particularly where the information forming the core of the publication by its nature was not available to the public generally.
The Court found that quite apart from what would be dis60. "Manifestly, the Court's concern with the integrity of the grand jury as
an investigating arm of the criminal justice system distinguishes Branzburg
from the case presently before us. If, as Mr. Justice Powell noted in that case,
instances will arise in which First Amendment values outweigh the duty of a
journalist to testify even in the context of a criminal investigation, surely in civil
cases, courts must recognize that the public interest in non-disclosure of journalists' confidential news sources will often be weightier than the private interest in compelled disclosure." 470 F.2d 778, 784-85.
61. Id. at 785.
62. 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).

closed if the anonymous news sources were divulged, the defendants had established their good faith and the Mayor had
wholly failed to demonstrate, with convincing clarity, that
either defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth.
Noting pre-Branzburg decisions refusing to grant to reporters
a testimonial privilege to withhold news sources, the court ruled
that "to routinely grant motions seeking compulsory disclosure
of anonymous news sources without first inquiring into the
substance of a libel allegation would utterly emasculate the
fundamental principles that underlay the line of cases articulating the constitutional restrictions to be engrafted upon the enforcement of State libel laws." 63 With regard to Branzburg itself, the Court noted that the Supreme Court was "not faced
with and therefore did not address the question whether a civil
of
libel suit should command the quite different reconciliation
64
conflicting interests pressed upon us here by the defense.
The Court concluded that "the point of principal importance
is that there must be a showing of cognizable prejudice before
the failure to permit examination of anonymous news sources
can rise to the level of error. Mere speculation or conjecture
65
about the fruits of such examination simply will not suffice.
The "Watergate" Case.
In Democratic National Committee v. McCord,66 the District
Court quashed ten subpoenas served on reporters for The New
York Times, The Washington Post, the Washington News Star,
and Time magazine by the defendants in a civil action growing
out of the Watergate break-in at the offices of the Democratic
National Committee.
The Court posed the competing interests between "the right of
the press to gather and publish, and that of the public to receive
news, from widespread, diverse and ofttimes confidential
sources" 67 on the one hand and the public's right to "every
man's evidence" 68 on the other. Noting that this was not a criminal case and that the parties seeking disclosure had not demonstrated that the testimony and materials sought go to the heart
of their claims, the Court joined the view of Mr. Justice Powell's
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 993.
Id. at 993, n.9.
Id. at 994.
356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
Id. at 1396; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
Id.

[Vol. 5: 351, 1978]

First Amendment Protection
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

concurring opinion in Branzburg and emphasized the constitutional interest in maintaining "an informed public capable of
conducting its own affairs ...
"61
Against this interest must be balanced the interests of parties to
receive evidence going to the substance of their claims. Yet there has
been no showing by the parties that alternative sources of evidence
have been exhausted or even approached as to the possible gleaning
of facts alternatively available from the Movants herein. Nor has there
been any positive showing of materiality of the documents and other
materials sought by the subpoenas. In the face of these considerations
the parties still insist that Movants in effect open their doors for
inspection.
The scales, however, are heavily weighed in the Movants
70
favor.

The Court found support in Baker v. F. & F. Investment 7' and
in the discussion in United States v. Liddy,7 2 which held that
First Amendment values will weigh differently in civil and
criminal cases.73
The "PatakaDaily News" Case.
In Loadholtz v. Fields,74 the Court refused, on First Amendment grounds, to compel a non-party reporter to produce documents or answer questions concerning statements made by a
defendant about a plaintiff which gave rise to a civil action.
In a veritable catalog of the landmark Supreme Court decisions upholding First Amendment freedoms, the Court summarized the fundamental concepts that "the First Amendment
69. Id. at 1398.
70. Id.
71. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1973).
72. 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972).
73. In conclusion, the Court notes that the First Amendment entitles the
public to more than a right to know. It also requires that any incursions
into the areas protected by the Bill of Rights will be given a prompt
judicial inquiry and hopefully one that will not only be sound but which
the public will also understand and 'accept. Government generally and
the courts in particular must always stand first in the vanguard of
upholding the spirit as well as the letter of the First Amendment freedoms which are among the most precious of a citizen's fundamental
rights. This is what this Court understands legitimate and necessary
'strict construction' of the Constitution to be all about. This incJudes
recognition of a special role for the press, for as written by James
Madison:
"A popular government without popular information or the means
of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy or perhaps
both." 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1398-99.
74. 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).

is the keystone of our constitutional democracy," that it "is
broad enough to include virtually all activities for the press to
fulfill its First Amendment functions, '75 that only a "compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First
Amendment freedoms; '76 and that "any justifiable infringeis
ment upon First Amendment rights must be no greater than
77
necessary to vindicate legitimate subordinating interests.
The Court emphasized that Branzburg involved a criminal
investigation, pointed out Mr. Justice Powell's view regarding
"the limited nature of the Court's holding" and noted that the
majority had recognized that news gathering "qualifies" for
First Amendment protection since "without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.
'78
(citations).
The Court quoted extensively from Baker v. F. & F. Investmen t, 79 for support that the wide open discovery provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not justify compulsory
disclosure from a journalist. And the Court found support in
Judge Sirica's analysis in United States v. Liddy,80 in which he
acknowledged that "First Amendment values will weigh differently in civil and criminal actions."'"
Finally, the Court found support in Democratic National
Committee v. McCord,82 "The paramount interest served by the
unrestricted flow of public information protected by the First
Amendment outweighs the subordinate interest served by the
liberal discovery provisions embodied in the Federal Rules of
'83
Civil Procedure.
Alternatively, citing Baker v. F. & F. Investment, the Court
exercised its broad discretion to limit discovery in a civil case.
75. Id. at 1300-1301.
76. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1962); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524 (1960); La et rel Gremillion, 366 U.S. 243, 296 (1961).
77. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
78. 389 F. Supp. at 1301.
79. 470 U.S. 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
80. "389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
81. Id. at 1302.
82. 356 F. Supp. at 1394.
83. "The plaintiff has ,shown no 'compelling' reason for this Court to
countermand the lofty principles embodied in the First Amendment. He has not
even demonstrated that the information sought could not be gleaned from other
sources such as interrogatories directed to or depositions of the defendants
themselves." 389 F. Supp. at 1302.
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The "MedicalLetter" Case.
In Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories,Inc. ,84 the Court refused
to compel the disclosure of the identity of the physician or
consultants who prepared an article for a medical journal
which indicated evidence of deaths resulting from a drug alleged to have caused severe and permanent disabilities to the
plaintiffs in an underlying civil lawsuit.
The Court acknowledged that the "right of litigants to discover and present relevant evidence in civil litigations is given
great weight in federal courts."8 5 Yet, based on Baker v. F. & F.
Investment, 6 Democratic National Committee v. McCord,87
and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell in Branzburg,
the Court refused to order discovery, notwithstanding the important public interest involved in the lawsuit and the virtual
impossibility of getting "first-hand evidence" other than by requiring the medical journal to disclose the sources of information contained in the article. The Court noted that parties requesting disclosure, in addition to demonstrating need, should
show that they are unable to obtain the information from a
source other than a journalist.
Because "the possible adverse affect on First Amendment
rights is a paramount consideration," 88 the Court ruled that
disclosure of 'the requested information would not be
compelled.
The "PacificGas and Electric" Case.
In Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas and Electric
Co. ,89 the Court refused to compel the disclosure of confidential
information obtained by a professor of public health during
interviews with employees of Pacific Gas and Electric. The
plaintiff in a civil action for breach of contract and defamation
had asserted that it may have been defamed during the professor's interviews.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D. N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 82.
470 U.S. 778 (2d. Cir. 1972).
356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
66 F.R.D. 78, 85.
71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976).

The Court noted that much of the raw data on which research
is based "simply is not made available except upon a pledge of
confidentiality" and that compelled disclosure of confidential
information "would without question severely stifle research in
the questions of public policy, the very subjects in which the
public interest is greatest." 90
Relying by analogy on cases "involving the qualified First
Amendment privilege of newsmen not to testify," the Court
arrived at guidelines for striking a balance between discovery
and non-disclosure: "The nature of the proceedings, whether
the deponent is a party, whether the information sought is available from other sources, and whether
the information sought
91
goes to the heart of the claim."
The Court stated that it was dealing with a civil proceeding;
that the professor was not a party; that the interviews were not
initiated with an eye to this litigation, and that any information
the professor may have had as to the identity of those P.G. & E.
officials holding certain views was available to the plaintiffs
through interrogatories propounded to P.G. & E. Analyzing the
liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the Court found "that the costs of compelling the discovery
sought . . .far outweigh the movants asserted interest in the
information sought. Accordingly . . .the motion . . .was de-

nied.,

92

The "Kepone" Case.
In Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp.,93 the Court refused to
compel the owner of radio station WLEE and television station
WXEX in Richmond, Virginia to produce reporters' notes,
drafts and documents secured in confidential conversations
concerning the chemical substance, Kepone, which the plaintiffs in the underlying civil action had alleged as the cause of
severe personal injuries. The defendant, Allied Chemical Corp.,
urged that the subpoena was necessary to secure information in
support of a motion for change of venue on the grounds of
prejudicial pretrial publicity and to provide information on the
subject matter of the lawsuit that may be helpful in organizing
and preparing the case.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 390.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Vir. 1976).
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Canvassing all of the cases to date, the decision forcefully
stated that:
The Court recognizes that to effectively gather information for the
conveyance of news to the public, it is often necessary for reporters to
make assurances either not to identify the source of the information
broadcast or published, or to broadcast or publish only part of the
information obtained, or both. If a news station or newspaper is forced to reveal the confidences of its reporters, the sources so disclosed,
other confidential sources of other reporters, and potential confidential sources will be significantly deterred from furnishing further
information to the press. Information lost to the press is information
lost to the public; unnecessary impediments to a newsman's ability to
gather facts, follow leads, and assimilate news can restrict the quality
of our news as effectively as censorship activities. Accordingly, the
Court holds that the First Amendment, protecting as it does the free
flow of information, provides newsmen a privilege from revealing
their confidential news sources in civil proceedings that may be abrogated
only in rare and compelling circumstances. (Citations omit94
ted)."

The Court found that Branzburg was not apposite, since the
majority opinion expressly limited the scope of the case to

grand jury subpoenas when it "struck a balance between the
significance of the newman's First Amendment rights and the
public's interest in pursuing investigations of criminal activity.99 5 Thus, "in the context of a civil trial, the rationales for

forcing a newsman to reveal his confidences are much
less
'96
weighty than those involved in criminal proceedings.

Since Allied Chemical Corp. had made no showing that the
reporter's confidential source information was crucial to the

development of its case, nor that such information was not
practicably

accessable through other channels, the Court

94. Id. at 508.
95. Id. at 509.
96. Id. at 510. The opinion further states:
While there is a social interest in resolving conflicts with justice and
fairness between private litigants, and the rules of compulsory process
are intended to further that interest, to gain information achieved by
forcing newsmen to reveal their confidences must be weighed against
the restricted access that newsmen would have to their informational
sources if such a procedure were adopted. There are generally several
avenues open to the civil litigant to acquire the sought after information,
of which subpoenaing newsmen is but one. Accordingly, the court
concludes that in civil litigation, the First Amendment requires that
newsmen be given a privilege against revealing their confidential
sources that may be abrogated only by a showing on the part of the
moving party that his only practical access to crucial information necessary for the development of the case is through the newsmen's sources.

quashed that portion of the subpoena which required disclosure
of confidential news sources.
The "KYW-T. V." Case.
In Altemose Construction Co. v. Building & Construction
Trades Council of Philadelphia97 the Court granted a motion to
quash a subpoena duces tecum and for a protective order preventing the disclosure of the files of television station KYW,
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, in a civil case. While rejecting an "absolute rule of privilege," the Court found that the
Supreme Court "has etched a case-by-case approach to the protection of news sources and background information, reflecting
a concern for the First Amendment protection of freedom of the
press. '98 Citing Baker v. F. & F. Investment,9 9 the Court noted
that this case-by-case analysis is "mandated even more in civil
cases than in criminal cases, for in the former the public's interest is casting a protective shroud over the newsman's sources
and information warrants an even greater weight than in the
latter." 100
Also relying upon Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories,Inc.,1
Democratic National Committee v. McCord, °2 and Loadholtz
v. Fields,'10 3 the Court noted that: "Several courts, in recent
years, have adopted such an approach to a newsman's resistance to requests for discovery in civil cases and found the First
Amendment interest to outweigh the litigant's need for full and
complete disclosure (Citations omitted)." 104 Applying the First
Amendment doctrine to the facts before it, the Court found that
"no particularized need" or "materiality" had been shown for
the requested documents and that "there has not even been a
demonstration that the
information could not be secured from
05
alternative sources.

'1

The "Lewiston Morning Tribune" Case.
Of interest is the state court decision in Caldero v. Tribune
97. (E.D. Pa. No. 73-773, May 16, 1977), reported at 2 MEDIA LAW REPORTS
1878.
98. Id. at 1879.
99. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
100. See note 97 supra.
101. 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
102. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
103. 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
104. Altemose Construction Co. v. Building & Construction Trades Council
of Philadelphia, supra.
105. Id. at 1880.
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Publishing Company. °8 In a three to two decision the Idaho
Supreme Court, with two strong dissents, held that a newspaperman sued for libel had no First Amendment privilege- absolute or qualified-to protect the identity of one of his
sources for the allegedly defamatory story. Accordingly a 30day contempt sentence was upheld. As an interpretation of the
United States Constitution, the decision is not precedential outside of Idaho or in the federal courts and the denial of the
newsman's Petition for Writ of Certiorari by the U.S. Supreme
Court is no indication
that a majority of that Court agrees with
10 7
decision.
the
The bare majority in Caldero chose to construe the plurality
opinion in Branzburg as rejecting any First Amendment
privilege whatsoever, but recognized that case was "cast in the
criminal area and testimony before a grand jury."' 10 8 The majority did not agree that Justice Powell's special concurring opinion detracted from the conclusiveness of the plurality opinion.
The decision distinguished Baker v. F. & F. Investment 1 9 by
noting that "the journalist was not a party to the underlying
action and that there was no showing that the identity of the
1 10
source was necessary to plaintiff's case."

106. 98 Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791, cert. denied 46 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Nov. 1,
1977).
107. The denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court "carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has
declined to review". Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950);
STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 5.7 at 213 (4th ed. 1969). The
denial of certiorari in Caldero is no more indicative of the Supreme Court's
position than its denial of certiorari in cases where the lower court had applied a
qualified First Amendment privilege. Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d
986 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1972); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
108. 98 Idaho 288, -, 562 P.2d 791, 795 (1977). However, the Caldero Court
did use Branzburg as a guideline for their decision.
109. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
110. 98 Idaho 288, -, 562 P.2d 791, 797 (1977). Curiously, the majority in
Caldero considered it "most important" that in Baker, both Illinois and New
York (the respective states in which the federal action was pending and the
discovery motion was heard) had enacted legislation protecting journalists from
forced disclosure of their sources. However it was not these state statutes which
led the court in Baker to establish a qualified First Amendment privilege, and
the absence of such legislation in Idaho should have been irrelevant to determining the proper scope of the newsman's federally protected rights in Caldero.

The majority concluded by acknowledging that in a society so organized as ours, the public must know the truth in order to make value
judgments, not the least of which regard its government and officialdom. The only reliable source of that truth is a press (which is to say
everyone-pamphleteers, nonconformists, undergrounders) which is
free to publish that truth without government censorship."'

But rather than take the next step which the federal decisions,
including Hirsch, have taken, the majority in Caldero expressed the view that it could not "accept the premise that the
public's right to know the truth is somehow enhanced by prohibiting the disclosure of truth in the courts of the public."1 1 2
The dissent of Justice Donaldson, joined in part by Justice
Bakes, takes the majority to task for ignoring the paramount
question involved in every case in which First Amendment
rights are infringed: whether there is a compelling interest justifying the infringment." 3 The dissent criticizes the majority for
attempting to resolve the case "simply by stating the general
theory that new testimonial privileges are disfavored or by stating the importance courts have traditionally placed on compelling testimony in a lawsuit."" 4 With respect to Branzburg, the
dissent points out that Justice White's plurality opinion did recognize that news gathering is entitled to First Amendment
protection'" and expressly limited its holding to grand jury
1 16
proceedings.
111. 98 Idaho 288, -, 562 P.2d 791, 801 (1977).
112. Id.
113. The dissent relied on the following Supreme Court decisions in support
of the proposition that the state must establish a compelling interest before the
balance will be tipped against the First Amendment: DeGregory v. Attorney
General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); Thomas v. Colins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Schneider v. States, 308 U.S. 147
(1939). See discussion in the dissent at 98 Idaho 288, -, 562 P.2d 791, 801 (1977).
114. 98 Idaho 288,-, 562 P.2d 791, 801-802 (1977). The dissent urges a balancing of "the interest in allowing the press unfettered access to sources of information and the interest in allowing courts unimpaired access to testimony in civil
litigation."(emphasis in original).
115. Justice White states "Nor is it suggested that newsgathering does not
qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press would be eviscerated". 408 U.S. at 681. At the
end of the opinion he states, "Finally as we have earlier indicated, newsgathering is not without its First Amendment protections and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly
different issues for resolution under the First Amendment." 408 U.S. at 707.
116. Justice White specifically limited the holding in Branzburg: "The sole
issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to Grand Jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation
into the commission of crime." 408 U.S. at 682. The dissent in Calderonotes that
"An exact reading of the issues raised in the Branzburg trilogy further limits the
Court's holding. The Court was presented with two issues, a reporter's appearance before a grand jury and his testimony to crimes that he actually witnessed." 98 Idaho 288, -, 562 P.2d 791, 802 n.1 (1977) (emphasis in the original).

374
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With respect to civil litigation, Justice Donaldson's dissent
painstakingly reviews the decisions in Garlandv. Torre,1 1 7 Baker v. F. & F. Investment,1 1 8 Carey v. Hume," 9 and Cervantes v.
Time, Inc. 120 and concludes that the basic theme of these decisions is that "newsgathering should enjoy a qualified
' 121

privilege."

The separate dissent of Justice Bakes agreed with Justice
Donaldson that "the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution affords a newsman a limited privilege against disclosure of his news sources in some cases.' 22 Adding one more
The dissent also points out that the majority failed to accept that part of
Justice Powell's concurring opinion which specifically left open to a newsgatherer the right to make a motion to quash or for a protective order whenever
he was "called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous
relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to
believe his testimony implicates confidential source relationships, without a
legitimate need of law enforcement." 408 U.S. at 710. As a result, by Justice
Donaldson's count, five Supreme Court Justices, Justice Powell and the four
dissenters, adopted at least a qualified privilege. 408 U.S. at 710. Justice Donaldson offers his opinion that Justice Powell's concurrence establishes a qualified
privilege because he "explicitly states that under certain circumstances he
would not force disclosure of sources". 98 Idaho 288 -, 562 P.2d 791, 804 n.3.
(1977). Justice Donaldson supports his view with Justice Powell's own words
from Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 859-860 (1974) which cited his
concurring opinion in Branzburg as emphasizing the "limited nature" of that
decision. He concluded that "a fair reading of the majority's analysis in Branzburg makes plain that the result hinged on an assessment of the competing
societal interests involved in that case rather than on my determination that
First Amendment rights are not implicated".
117. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
118. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972).
119. 492 F.2d 631 (D. Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
120. 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972).
121. 98 Idaho 288 -, 562 P.2d 791, 808 (1977). Justice Donaldson summarizes
the present state of the law as follows: "The courts set off the public interest in a
robust First Amendment against the private interest in compelled testimony.
Equilibrium was reached by allowing a qualified privilege-courts would
compel disclosure only when the plaintiff could show that the identity of the
source was critical to his case. There were variations from court to court (Garland and Baker would require exhaustion of alternate sources), but each of the
courts used this standard to delineate the limits of the privilege." In applying
this standard to the particular facts in Caldero, Justice Donaldson would have
ruled that the plaintiff has utterly failed to establish the critical importance of
the identity of the particular source, because the only possible relevance is that
an inference of actual malice would arise if the source was either non-existent or
irresponsible, but only if plaintiff's allegations already had some basis in fact
before disclosure. 98 Idaho 288, -, 562 P.2d 791, 808 (1977).
122. 98 Idaho 288, -, 562 P.2d 791, 808 (1977). Justice Bakes reasoned that
"even where discovery is ultimately ordered, it is only after application of a
balancing of First Amendment interests in a free press against the right of

nuance to this complex area, Justice Bakes stated that the confidential information would have been sufficiently critical to the
issue of actual malice to overcome the privilege, but for the fact
that he would be prepared to find the underlying newspaper
1 23
story was not false and defamatory.
2.

Legal Commentary

This area of the law has generated a wide range of scholarly
commentaries both before and after the decision in Branz124

burg.

litigants to discovery of material information, and then narrowly prescribing
the questions which must be answered".
123. "In light of the fact that I believe that the article in question is not
defamatory of Caldero, it would serve no purpose to allow discovery of the
unidentified police expert, and therefore under the circumstances here, I would
reverse the order of the district court holding appellant Shelledy in contempt."
98 Idaho 288 -, 562 P.2d 791, 812 (1977).
Justice Bakes' dissent underscores the real tragedy of cases such as Caldero.
If Justice Bakes is correct that the article at issue is not false and defamatory to
begin with, then all of the litigation, including the newsman's conviction for
contempt, is irrelevant and serves only to allow unnecessary explorations into a
newsman's sources with no likelihood of the plaintiff ultimately establishing his
libel claims. The specter of public figures bringing llbel suits against newsmen
as a device to expose their sources with the inevitable embarrassment of the
particular source and the chilling effect on other potential sources, must be
condemned by everyone who values our system of free expression. As a result,
Justice Bakes' approach, by making a preliminary determination of whether the
underlying material is false and defamatory, provides a concrete means by
which to ferret out frivolous libel claims before the courts and the parties
launch into extensive litigation over confidential sources.
124. Pre-Branzburg: Guest & Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgument for
Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 N.W.L. REV. 18 (1969); Blasi, The Newsmen's Privilege:An EmpiricalStudy, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229 (1971); Nelson, The
Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosureof ConfidentialSources and Information, 24 VAN. L. REV. 667 (1971); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The
ConstitutionalRight to a Confidential Relationship,80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970);
Note, The Newsmen's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1198 (1970). Post-Branzburg:
Note, 51 N. CARO. L. REV. 562 (1973); Comment, A Need for Statutory Protection
of News Sources, 61 Ky. L.J. 551 (1973); Comment, Journalists& TheirSources,
58 IOWA L. REV. 618 (1973); Note, 18 VILLANOVA L. REV. 288 (1973); Note, 41
FORDHAM L. REV. 1024 (1973); Comment, Newsman's Privilege, 25 U. FLA. L.
REV. 381 (1973); Comment, Newsman's PrivilegeStatutes, 49 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 150 (1973); Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege,11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233
(1974); Comment, The Journalist'sPrerogativeof Non-Disclosure, 20 LOYOLA
L. REV. 120 (1974); Comment, Subpoenas to Compel Disclosureof Confidential
Information, 49 L.A.B. BULL. 133 (1974); Comment, JournalistsIn the Courts, 8
U.S.F. L. REV. 644 (1974); Note, 9 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 171 (1974); Note, Newsman's Source Privilege,26 U. FLA. L. REV. 453 (1974); Note, Dixon, Newsman's
Privilege by FederalLegislation, 1 HASTINGS CONST. LAW. Q. 39 (1974); Note, 53
BOST. U.L. REV. 497 (1973); Note, Newsman's Privilege Two Years After Branzburg, 49 TULANE L. REV. 417 (1975); Grodde, The Developing QualifiedPrivilege

for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975); Note, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 379
(1976); Note, Murphy Journalist's Privilege, 52 TExAs L. REV. 829 (1974);
Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing QualifiedPrivilegefor Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975); Comment, Right of the Press to Gather
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Although society has an important interest in affording a vehicle for
settling private disputes in a peaceable manner, scholars have agreed
that the interests of civil litigants in compelling disclosure of a journalist's confidences are less compelling than those of criminal litigants. Society has a greater interest in obtaining information that may
facilitate the apprehension and conviction of criminals than in aiding
an individual in an action for a private wrong. Similarly, society has a
greater interest in assuring a criminal defendant every reasonable
than in protecting a civil defendant
means of proving his innocence
125
from an adverse judgment.

Aside from generally supporting protection for confidential
sources, most commentators have emphasized that Branzburg,

(decided in a criminal context) sets little precedence in civil
litigation. Whereas a criminal defendant's rights to evidence
a civil litigant's rights to discovery
derive from the Constitution,
126
are purely statutory.

The Supreme Court, in a series of decisions beginning with
New York Times v. Sullivan, 2 7 subordinated the private inter-

ests of certain civil litigants to the overriding interests guaranteed by the First Amendment. Notwithstanding the admitted
injury to reputation and privacy, the Supreme Court has held

that the First Amendment requires denial of recovery in civil
libel and invasion of28privacy suits brought by public figures

absent actual malice.'

Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PENN. L. REV. 166 (1976); Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REV. 52, 137-48 (1972); Comment, The
CaliforniaApproach to the Yielding of the Newsman's Shielding Law, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313 (1976).
125. Murasky, The Journalist'sPrivilege Branzburg & Its Aftermath, 52
TEX. L. REV. 829, 898-99 (1974).
126. "Nondisclosure of information or nonproduction of films may work to
the disadvantage of civil litigants, but their right to compel testimony, unlike the
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right, and their right to a fair trial,
unlike the criminal defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, lack
constitutional stature and are, according to New York Times and the series of
cases following it, subordinate in any event to freedom of the press."
Comment, The Newman's Privilege Government Investigation, Criminal
Prosecutionsand Private Litigation, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1198, 1227 (1970). "In the
case of civil litigation, the public has no interest in the outcome; only the litigants have anything at stake, and hence compelled testimony serves only their
private interest."
127. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
128. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). "In such cases as Time, Inc. v. Hill,
discussed earlier, the Supreme Court indicated its willingness to sacrifice an
individual's interest in recovery for society's strong interest in freedom of the
press." 64 N.W. U. L. REV. 181 (1969). "Analogously, the injury to a litigant in a
civil action caused by his inability to force a newsman to identify his confidential source is justified by the superior interest in the dissimination of news."

The analogy is particularly apt since the Supreme Court in
New York Times and its progeny was not faced with any direct
state interference with the press but only with the availability in
private libel actions of damage awards sanctioned through the
state court system. Likewise, although the compulsory testimony in a civil action involves no direct state interference with
the press, the availability of subpoenas and the enforcement
thereof through civil and criminal contempt sanctioned through
the state court system provides a comparable abridgment of
First Amendment freedoms.
The cost of defeat in criminal proceedings, involving imprisonment and the stigma of social condemnation, is more severe
than in civil litigation. Therefore, the Constitution, the Supreme
Court, and the judicial system itself recognize many procedural
safeguards, as a margin of error, that are not adopted in civil
litigation. This distinction has been cited as a justification for
compulsory production of confidential information to protect a
129
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.
In addition to the differences of constitutional dimension between criminal and civil proceedings, it is well established that
the purposes of civil discovery will often give way to matters of
privacy (such as the nondisclosure of tax returns, selective service records, accident reports, and census responses),'13 the inviolability of certain relationships (such as testimonial
privileges affecting doctors, priests, lawyers, accountants, and
others), and even the personal convenience of the witness or the
parties (such as geographical restrictions on the scope of subpoenas). 3 1 Although these limits necessarily foreclose avenues
Guest and Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgument for Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 N.W.U.L. REV. 18, 35-36 (1969).
129. Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a
ConfidentialRelationship, 80 YALE L. REV. 317, 359-60 (1970).
130. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2377 et seq. (McNaughton Rev. 1961). Privilege

for communications to government such as reports made by citizens under
compulsion of law (tax returns, accident reports, etc.).
131.: FED. R. Civ. P. 45:

(2) A resident of the district in which the deposition is to be taken may
be required to attend an examination only in the county wherein he
resides or is employed or transacts his business in person, or at such
other convenient place as is fixed by an order of court. A nonresident of
the district may be required to attend only in the county wherein he is
served with a subpoena, or within 40 miles from the place of service, or
at such other convenient place as is fixed by an order of court.
(e) Subpoena for a Hearing or Trial.
(1) At the request of any party subpoenas for attendance at a hearing
or trial shall be issued by the clerk of the district court for the district in
which the hearing or trial is held. A subpoena requiring the attendance
of a witness at a hearing or trial may be served at any place within the
district, or at any place without the district that is within 100 miles of the
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of civil discovery, they are accepted because of the importance
of competing interests: interests certainly no greater than the

First Amendment.
The very breadth of pretrial civil discovery provides an additional argument for limiting compulsory disclosure by journal-

ists of confidential information. The broad discovery provisions
of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure purport to
authorize a party to discover "any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action"

and specifically denies any objection on the ground "that the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."1'32
LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS AT DEALING WITH THE
PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

State Statutes

The courts have not been alone in attempting to come to grips
with the protection of journalists' confidential sources of information. For over 40 years state legislatures have enacted various statutory provisions providing protection, in one form or

another, for the confidential sources of newsmen. 133 The
place of the hearing or trial specified in the subpoena; and, when a
statute of the United States provides therefore, the court upon proper
application and cause shown may authorize the service of a subpoena at
any other place.
132. 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2602(3) (1970). "During discovery the

litigant's interest in a favorable outcome is not yet directly at stake. Furthermore, civil discovery rules permit litigants to engage in wide-ranging fishing
expeditions and to obtain information that may never be used if, for example,
the parties settle their dispute out of court. Granting broad power to civil
litigants to compel the production of information unnecessary to the vindication
of their interests engenders self-censorship by the press and its sources." 52 TEX.
L. REV. 829, 899 (1974).
133. ALA. CODE, Tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1973); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1976); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 421.100 (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1454 (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN.
CODE, Art. 35, § 2 (1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 767.5 (a) (Supp. 1956); MICH.. SAT.
ANN. § 28.945 (1972); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-601-3 (1964); NEv. REV. STAT. §
49.274 (1973); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:84A-21, 2A:84A-29 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
20-1-12.1 (1970); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2739.12 (1954); OKLA. CODE OF CrVIL PROC. § 385.1 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 28, §

330 (Supp. 1975). See Schwartz, The CaliforniaApproach to the Yielding of the
Newsman's Shield Law, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 313, 320-36 (1976) and D'Alem-

is representative of the approach taken in
California statute
13 4
many states.
The California statute appears to protect a newsman from
contempt, but it has been suggested that the provision does not
create a privilege and thus may not prevent the use of other
sanctions for a refusal to make discovery when the journalist is

a party to a civil proceeding.1 35 The statute provides protection

for both the "source of any information procured" by the newsman, as well as for "any unpublished information obtained or
prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of any information for communication to the public." Notwithstanding the apparent scope of Section 1070 covering any "medium of
communication" by which information is gathered "for
communication to the public," the specific terms of the statute
limit its application only to those who are or have been
"connected with or employed" by a "newspaper, magazine, or
other periodical publication," "press association or wire service," or "radio or television station." As such, Section 1070 does
berg, Journalists Under the Acts: Protectionof ConfidentialSources of Information, 6HARV. J. LEGIS. 307 (1969) for an examination of the state statutes.
134. The full text of CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1977) reads as
follows:
(a) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or
employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication,
or by a press association or wire service, or any person who has been so
connected or employed, cannot be adjudged in contempt by a judicial,
legislative, administrative body, or any other body having the power to
issue subpoenas, or refusing to disclose, in any proceeding as defined in
Section 901, the source of any information procured or also connected
or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information
obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving, or processing of information for communication to the public.
(b) Nor can a radio or television news reporter or other person
connected with or employed by a radio or television station, or any
person who has been so connected or employed, be so adjudged in
contempt for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for news or news commentary
purposes on radio or television, or for refusing to disclose and unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving, or processing of information for communication to the pfublic.
(c) As used in this section, 'unpublished information' includes information not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, whether or not related information has been disseminated, and includes, but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to
the public through a medium of communications, whether or not published information based upon or related to such information has been
disseminated.
135. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1977), Comment Assembly Committee on Judiciary. See Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D. N.Y. 1964). It
should be noted, however, that the predecessor of § 1070 was originally enacted
in 1935 by amendment to former CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 1881 as subdivision 6
among a list of privileges against giving testimony.
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not cover every form of expression protected by the First
1 36
Amendment.
The latest development in the field of state protection for
confidential sources is a proposal to elevate the existing California shield law contained in Section 1070 to an amendment to the
provision of the California Constitution guaranteeing freedom
137
of speech.
The Constitutional amendment has been prompted by two
3 8
California decisions, Farr v. Superior Court'
and Rosato v.
139
Superior Court in which Section 1070 was construed as inapplicable to the Court's investigation of particular violations of a
court order restricting court officials from engaging in pretrial
publicity. In these decisions, the California courts relied upon
(1) the inherent power of the judiciary as a separate branch of
government to control their proceedings and the conduct of
court officials, and (2) the duty of the courts to follow the mandate of the United States Supreme Court that under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
trial courts must control pretrial publicity emanating from
court officials and attaches.
136. The Oklahoma newsmen's privilege statute, which might have provided
additional support for the decision in Hirsch, was actually cited by the District
Court as a limitation on the scope of the privilege. While the Oklahoma statute
protects a "newsman" from compulsory disclosure of both the source and any
unpublished information obtained or prepared in "gathering, receiving or processing of information for any medium of communication to the public" and
although "medium of communication" is defined to include (but presumably not
be limited to) "any newspaper, magazine, other periodical, book, pamphlet,
news service, wire service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or
network, or cable television system", the critical word "newsman" is limited to
"any man or woman who is a reporter, photographer, editor, commentator,
journalist, correspondent, announcer, or other individual regularly engaged in
obtaining, writing, reviewing, editing, or otherwise preparing news for any
newspaper, periodical, press association, newspaper syndicate, wire service,
radio or television station, or other news service". OKLA. CODE OF CIv. PROC. §§
385.1 and 385.2 (Supp. 1977). Hirsch's role as a documentary filmmaker did not
fall within the definition of "newsman" although clearly a documentary motion
picture re-enacting historical events is a "medium of communication to the
public".
137. "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
138. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971). See the review of the Farr
litigation at the text accompanying notes 143 to 153.
139. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975).

It appears as though the elevation of Section 1070 to the stature of a constitutional amendment would be construed to
supersede the inherent power of the state judiciary on the
theory that it was a constitutional response to the judicially
created exceptions to Section 1070 established by Farr and
Rosato. In addition, as a matter of constitutional interpretation,
an irreconcilable conflict between two constitutional provisions
will be resolved 0in favor of that provision which was most re14
cently adopted.
But the second rationale used by the California courts to
emasculate Section 1070 may well not be eliminated even by
incorporating that provision in the California Constitution. The
concern for the affect of pretrial publicity on the rights of a
criminal defendant are dictated by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. It is settled that
where a conflict exists between a state constitutional right or
provision and a federal constitutional right (here a right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury) the State Constitution is inferior and
subordinated to the United States Constitution.14 1 As a result, an
amendment promoting Section 1070 to constitutional stature
would not serve its intended purpose of preventing the erosion
of the journalists' right to protect confidential sources of information, at least where that right, in the facts of a particular case,
conflicts with the federally guaranteed rights of a criminal de42
fendant.
Aside from the potential futility of the proposed constitutional amendment, there is a serious danger in mechanically enacting Section 1070 in its present form as a constitutional right.
First, as noted, Section 1070 only protects a newsman from
being adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose a source of
information or unpublished information and is at best ambiguous in granting a testimonial privilege in all proceedings,
whether criminal, civil, administrative or legislative. Before this
provision becomes emblazoned in the California Constitution,
full protection by way of a testimonial privilege and not merely
140. In re Mascolo, 25 Cal. App. 92 (1914). Such an intention could be articulated by the inclusion of an affirmative declaration to this effect in the
preamble to the constitutional amendment.
141. U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2; Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Co., 223 U.S. 1, 54 (1911).
142. Elevating Section 1070 to a place in the California Constitution would
also have no binding affect on proceedings in federal courts where matters of
evidence, including testimonial privileges, are controlled by federal procedural
law. FED. R. EVID. 50i.
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limited protection against one form of punishment should be
enacted.
Secondly, as noted Section 1070 is grudgingly narrow in its
scope by covering only those who are connected with or employed by a "newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication," "press association or wire service," or "radio or television station." This attempt to catalog particular media of
communication should be abandoned in favor of coverage coextensive with all forms of expression protected by both the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution.
Language to achieve this result already exists in Section 1070
which defines the type of information covered as that which is
"obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of
information for communication to the public." Just as the First
Amendment and the California Constitution protect the freedom of "speech" and "press" without further limitation, a
constitutional right to protect confidential sources of information should not pick and choose among various types of publications or media of expression. The choice to communicate information to the public through books and pamphlets rather than
newspapers or magazines, or motion pictures rather than television and radio should not result in the loss of a right enjoyed by
those who have perhaps chosen more traditional or conventional means. Our constitutional system does not permit favoring
one form of expression over another when it comes to protection from criminal or civil penalties.
The first attempt to fashion a state constitutional right to
protect confidential sources of information provides California
with a unique opportunity to insure wide open and robust protection, thereby setting a precedent for other states and,indeed
for the Federal Government to do likewise. Thousands of hours
of precious judicial time spent construing and interpreting
statutory provisions like Section 1070 can be saved by the enactment of a simple constitutional right to the effect that: "No
person shall be compelled in any proceeding to disclose the
source or content of any information confidentially obtained or
prepared in gathering, receiving or processing information for
communication to the public by any medium."

William Farrand the Charles Manson Transcript
The ordeal of newsman William Farr displays the intractable
legal proceedings which can ensnare a journalist because of the
uncertainties in this field of law.
William Farr, then a reporter for the Herald Examiner in Los
Angeles, California, was assigned to cover the famous Charles
Manson murder trial. In December, 1969, Judge Charles Older
issued an Order re Publicity prohibiting any attorney, court
employee, attache or witness from releasing for public dissemination the content or nature of any testimony on which the
Court might subsequently have to rule regarding its admissibility. In preparing its case against Manson and his followers, the
prosecutors interviewed Mrs. Virginia Graham who disclosed a
confession by Susan Atkins, one of the defendants, that the
Manson Family had planned to kill Elizabeth Taylor, Richard
Burton, Frank Sinatra, Tom Jones and Steve McQueen. A select
number of copies of Mrs. Graham's pretrial statement were
distributed to the six defense attorneys and the prosecutors.
On October 9, 1970 the Herald Examiner ran a story by Mr.
Farr under the headline "Liz, Sinatra on Slay List-Tate Witness" detailing the gory aspects of the Atkins' confession. The
following day, Mrs. Graham appeared at the Manson trial and
testified to certain aspects of Ms. Atkins' admissions, but some
of the matters which had been printed in the newspaper were
not admitted into evidence.
After Manson and the others were convicted, Judge Older, on
May 19, 1971, convened a special hearing to investigate the apparent violation of his previous Order re Publicity. In what later
proved to be an unfortunate career change, Mr. Farr, by that
time, had left the Herald Examiner to become-of all thingsPress Secretary to the late Joseph Busch, Los Angeles District
Attorney, whose office had prosecuted the Manson Family.
At the special hearing, Mr. Farr testified that two of the six
defense attorneys and one other person subject to the Order re
Publicity, had provided him with copies of the Graham statement. Each of the defense attorneys testified under oath that he
had not directly or indirectly provided Mr. Farr with the statement. Relying upon Section 1070,'13 Mr. Farr refused to identify
his sources and was held in civil contempt.
Mr. Farr appealed his contempt conviction, but the California
143. See note 134, supra.
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Court of Appeals refused to overturn it.'" It held that since the
Court was under a constitutional obligation in a criminal case to
keep prejudicial material from the news media and the public,
no public purpose145was frustrated by compelling Mr. Farr to
reveal his sources.
The Court purposely avoided the opportunity to deal with the
proper scope of the California Shield Law. Indeed, an invitation
to face the very issue decided six years later in the Hirsch case
was declined. 146 The California Supreme Court denied hearing
1 47
and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
After Mr. Farr rejected an opportunity to purge himself, he
was incarcerated in the Los Angeles County Jail. His Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California was denied. Both that
Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit denied bail pending appeal, but Justice Douglas granted
148
Farr's release on his own recognizance pending appeal.
In the meantime, Farr filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus in
the California state court, but it too was denied. 49 However, the
Court did not leave Mr. Farr without relief and, in fact, planted
the seed which later ended Mr. Farr's ordeal. The Court reasoned that Mr. Farr's civil contempt sentence was not "punitive," but rather "coercive." Therefore, the Court acknowledged
that once a point was reached so that the incarceration of the
contemnor becomes penal, its duration is limited by the five day
maximum sentence provided in California Code of Civil Procedure § 1218. With this opportunity available, the court stayed the
144. Farr v. Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99
Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971). The court made its ruling while Branzburg v. Hayes was
still pending before the United States Supreme Court and anticipated the
balancing approach thereafter adopted.
145. The court stated that "the need for disclosure of source must be weighed to determine whether it is as compelling as to outbalance the vital interest in
uninhibited flow of news." 22 Cal. App. 3d at 72, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
146. "Thus, respondent notes that the Section (CAL. EvI. CODE § 1070), while
immunizing persons connected with newspapers, radio and television from
contempt for failure to reveal a source does not protect persons connected with
magazines, free lance authors, lecturers or pamphleteers. (In re Cepeda, 233 F.
Supp. 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) Cf. Comment, 6 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L.
REV. 119, 130);" 22 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
147. 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
148. 409 U.S. 1243 (1973).
149. In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 111 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).

execution of Farr's contempt sentence to permit him to institute
appropriate proceedings in the trial court.
On August 7, 1975, Farr lost his last opportunity to prevent the

enforcement of the original contempt conviction when the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed
15 0

the denial of his Federal Habeas Corpus Petition.

Back in the trial court, Mr. Farr prevailed in convincing the
trial judge that no amount of incarceration could force him to
divulge his confidential sources. Satisfied with the sincerity of
that position, the Court ruled that further imprisonment would
become penal and must be limited by the maximum sentence
provided by law. 151 Mr. Farr's nine year legal battle (which is
still not over) gives some indication of the unfortunate complexities of this field and the need for plain statutes or workable
judicial holdings.
ProposedFederal Statutes

Although various forms of federal legislation have been proposed to deal with the protection of confidential
sources of
15 2
information, to date none have been enacted.

150. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975). The Court held that ...
the Supreme Court of the United States has considered the question and appears to have fashioned at least a partial First Amendment shield available to
newsmen, who are subjected to various demands to divulge the source of confidentially secured information. In striking the proper balance in the Farr case,
the Court held that "the paramount interest to be protected was that of the
power of the Court to enforce its duty and obligation relative to the guarantee of
due process to the defendants in the ongoing trial. On June 30, 1976, the United
States Supreme Court, with Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent, denied
certiorari and thereby declined a second opportunity to review the history of the
Farr litigation. Farr v. Pitchess, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). However, two of the six
defense attorneys, Paul Fitzgerald and Irving Kanarek, filed a $24 million civil
libel suit against Mr. Farr, alleging that their reputations had been damaged by
his refusal to admit that they were not the attorneys guilty of having violated
Judge Older's Order re Publicity. Not changing his mind (whether the punishment was imprisonment or bankruptcy), Mr. Farr refused to answer questions
about whether either of the attorneys had delivered the Graham statement. As a
sanction imposed for his refusal, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Robert Wel
established as a fact not subject to dispute at trial that neither Mr. Fitzgerald nor
Mr. Kanarek had released the statement to Farr.
151. Shedding some doubt on whether Mr. Farr can withstand pecuniary
punishment in the same fashion as the loss of his liberty, it has been reported
that his attorney in the civil libel case unsuccessfully argued that the critical
questions should be left unanswered until the time of trial, "when Farr would be
given an opportunity to answer them before a jury." Los Angeles Times, October 1, 1977, Part I, at 26, col. 4.
152. See, e.g., Congressional Record: S. 1311, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1971); S.
3552 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970); H.R. 16328, H.R. 16704 91st Cong. 2nd Sess.
(1970); S. 1851, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 8519, H.R. 7787, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963); S. 965, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 355, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
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In the absence of federal legislation, Attorney General Edward H. Levi in 1975 promulgated guidelines for United States
attorneys "with regard to the issuance of subpoenas to, and the
interrogation, indictment, or arrest of, members of the news
media. ' '153

The

preamble

to

the

Department

of

Justice

guidelines states that:
Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of
reporters to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power
of the government should not be used in such a way that it impairs a
reporter's responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial
public issues. In balancing the concern that the Department of Justice
has for the work of the news media and the Department's obligation to
the fair administration of justice, the following
4 guidelines shall be
adhered to by all members of the Department.11

The guidelines expressly adopt a balancing approach between "the public's interest in the free dissemination of ideas
and information and the public's interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice." Even before
considering the issuance of a subpoena to a newsman, the
guidelines require that "all reasonable attempts should be made
to obtain information from non-media sources. . . ." Thereafter, the guidelines require that "negotiations" with the media
should attempt "to accommodate the interests of the trial or
grand jury with the interests of the media." Failing that, no
subpoena may be issued without the express authorization of
the Attorney General based on certain principles including:
(a) There should be reasonable ground to believe that the information sought is essential to a successful investigation and not peripheral
common non-essential or speculative.
(b) The government should have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the information from alternative non-media sources.
(c)

Subpoenas should be limited to the verification of published

(1959). One such proposal would have provided that "A witness who is employed
by a newspaper, news service, newspaper syndicate, periodical or radio or
television station or network, as a writer, reporter, correspondent, or commentator, or in any other capacity directly involved in the gathering or presentation
of news, shall not be required in any court of the United States to disclose the
source of any information obtained in such capacity unless in the opinion of the
court such disclosure is necessary in the interest of national security." Staff of
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., The Newsman's
Privilege (Comm. Print 1966).
153. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976). The full text of the Attorney General's policy
guidelines are set forth in Appendix A to this article.
154. See note 130, supra.

information and to such surrounding circumstances as relate to the
accuracy of the published information.
(d) Subpoenas should involve a limited subject matter, a reasonably limited period of time and should avoid requiring production of a
large volume of unpublished material. 155
Although the Attorney General's guidelines are not legally
binding on private parties, they do express a well-reasoned policy which should be given careful consideration by the courts
when the discovery efforts of private litigants place in jeopardy
exactly the same First Amendment rights which the government's policy protects. It has been effectively argued by The
Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press that private
litigants should not have greater rights to compel disclosure of
journalists confidential information than the Attorney General
of the United States under the Department of Justice
guidelines. 5 6
The absence of federal legislation has left a vacuum in which,
unfortunately, proponents of punitive regulations have been the
first to venture. In 1973 the Nixon administration introduced as
Senate Bill 1, a repressive new Federal Criminal Code. S.1 went
through several amendments and was ultimately defeated.
Much of the proposal has been incorporated in Senate Bill 1437
sponsored by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D. Mass.) and the
late Senator John L. McClellan (D. Ark.). S. 1437 contains a
series of changes in various aspects of federal criminal law
which have been criticized for reflecting "the undemocratic
view that the government requires protection from the citizens
of this nation." These include conspiracy, criminal solicitation,
use immunity, and witness tampering. It also incorporates several provisions which would "diminish the ability of the press"
' 157
to foster "an unfettered flow of information.'
155. Id.
156. The current Guidelines grew out of an earlier Department of Justice
policy issued in 1970 to all U.S. Attorneys which stated:
The Department of Justice recognizes that compulsory process in some
circumstances may have a limiting effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights. In determining whether to request issuance of a
subpoena to the press, the approach in every case must be to weigh that
limiting effect against the public interest to be served in the fair administration of justice ....
The Department of Justice does not consider the
press an investigative arm of the government. Therefore, all reasonable
attempt should be made to obtain information from non-press sources
before there is any consideration of subpoenaing the press. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE MEMO No. 692 (September 2, 1970).
157. Editorial, StandingHistory on its Head, Los Angeles Times September
6, 1977, part II, at 6 col. -. The editorial urged the defeat of S. 1437 which
reflected the "pervasive feeling that the government, in order to insure our
security, must have the authority to closely monitor the political freedom of
American citizens. To the contrary, our security ultimately rests on the robust
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With reference to confidential sources of information S. 1437
would permit a police officer, without a subpoena, to demand
the possession of a news reporters notes or photographs taken
at a public meeting or demonstration. A refusal could result in
prosecution with a possible long jail term and a heavy fine.
Under another section of S. 1437, a news reporter could be jailed
and fined for refusing to testify or produce information to protect a confidential source. The proposal does contain an enticing
provision which would give a witness a defense to these crimes
if he has a legal privilege for refusing to testify. But the bill fails
to codify the qualified First Amendment privilege which has
been recognized in a series of federal civil cases culminating in
the Hirsch decision. It is open to question whether the vague
reference to the defense of privilege in S. 1437 will be construed
as legislative recognition or denial of the First Amendment
privilege.
It is particularly disconcerting that proponents and critics of
S. 1437 cannot even agree on the meaning of its provisions,
including those relating to confidential sources. In many circumstances vague statutes attempting to regulate the press can
be more dangerous and can engender more self-censorship than
explicit regulations which at least set the stage for direct
constitutional attack. Indeed, Senator Kennedy argues that the
bill would provide a defense for refusing to testify or produce
documents if a person had "a legal privilege to refuse to disclose
15 8
the information."'
Critics have charged that S. 1437 "would make it a crime for a
reporter or a news organization to refuse to disclose confidential news sources to police or courts" and have asserted that the
bill seriously damages the "basic elements in our system of
individual rights" including the "free flow of information about
159
the government."'
vitality of democratic institutions that inspire the strongest kind of loyalty: the
uncommanded allegiance of a free people."
158. Edward M. Kennedy Criminal-Code Reform Would Aid Liberty Los
Angeles Times, September 27, 1977 part II, at 7, col. -.
159. Editorial, Standing History on its Head, Los Angeles Times September
6, 1977, part II at 6, col. -. "Protection of the confidentiality of sources of
information is vital to the gathering of news. It is particularly significant in the
exposure of corruption in government." Letter to the Los Angeles Times from
Thomas I. Emerson, Law School, Yale University, October 17, 1977, part II, at 6,
col. -.

If the sponsors of this reform legislation can be convinced to
specifically codify a First Amendment privilege, then S. 1437
could truly serve as the step forward for civil liberties which its
proponents say it is.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE

Hirsch DECISION

Against the background of prior court decisions and the unsettled condition of statutory "shield law" protection, the
Hirsch decision came as a reassurance of protection for a wide
spectrum of newsmen and as the first judicial expression of
protection for confidential sources of information outside of the
traditional newspaper and broadcast media.
On November 13, 1974, on State Highway 74 outside of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Karen Silkwood died in an automobile
accident. Buzz Hirsch, then a graduate student in the Film Department at the University of California at Los Angeles, learned
of the incident and the questions surrounding her death. Together with Larry Cano, an instructor in the Film Department
at UCLA, Hirsch discussed the idea of producing a factual motion picture account of Karen Silkwood's life and the incidents
surrounding her death. The questions raised by the mysterious
160
automobile accident had begun to draw national attention.
Hirsch and Cano began interviewing individuals who had
known Karen Silkwood, either through her employment at The
Kerr-McGee Corporation, or personally. Hirsch also interviewed individuals who had knowledge of the operation of The
Kerr-McGee facilities. In every interview Hirsch informed those
interviewed that it was his intention to make a factually accurate motion picture which necessitated his extensive investigation and research. In virtually every interview, those interviewed demanded and Hirsch assured them that information
and documentation received from them would be kept confidential. In addition, in some instances, interviewees demanded
that their identities not be revealed, and Hirsch assured them
that their identities would be kept confidential. It is no wonder
that there was great reluctance to discuss Karen Silkwood's
affairs, in light of the circumstances of her death.
On November 5, 1977 a federal action was filed in the United
160. The March 1975 issuance of Ms. Magazine carried a story entitled "The
Case of Karen Silkwood-The Death of a Nuclear Power Plant Worker Raises
the Spector of Murder and A Terrifying Technological Reality". And the April,
1975 issue of Rolling Stone Magazine carried an article by investigative reporter Howard Kohn entitled "The Nuclear Industry's Terrible Power and How It

Silenced Karen Silkwood".
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States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma by
William M. Silkwood, the Administrator of the Estate of Karen
G. Silkwood and by William E. Meadows, the Guardian of the
three infant heirs of Karen Silkwood, against The Kerr-McGee
Corporation, individual officers, directors and employees of
Kerr-McGee, two identified agents and one unidentified agent
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and an official informant
of the FBI. The defendants were charged with conspiracy to
prevent Karen Silkwood from organizing a lawful labor union
at Kerr-McGee in violation of her constitutional rights; conspiracy to prevent Karen Silkwood from filing complaints against
Kerr-McGee under the Atomic Energy Act in violation of her
constitutional rights; and willful and wanton negligence in
contaminating Karen Silkwood with toxic plutonium radiation.
While Hirsch was in Oklahoma City in connection with his
research, he was served with a subpoena duces tecum by one of
the attorneys for Kerr-McGee. The subpoena commanded him
to appear for the taking of his deposition in Oklahoma City and
to bring with him all documents in his possession under 21
categories, including public records and correspondence with
Kerr-McGee itself, as well as correspondence exchanged between any person and 26 identified persons and organizations.
At the heart of the subpoena was a request for all of Hirsch's
papers relating to "any investigation of the facts and circumstances of the death of KAREN SILKWOOD or the contamination by radioactive materials of the person or property of KAREN SILKWOOD," and all documents and "scripts" relating to
('a motion picture or television production which may be made
by you, Larry Cano or Carand Productions, Inc. based in whole
or in part on portions of the life and activity of KAREN SILKWOOD."
The procedural history of Hirsch's attempt to quash the subpoena is in itself an important area of analysis confronting an
attorney in such a proceeding. 1 1 Suffice it to say, the District
161. A procedural technicality might have sidetracked the Court in Hirsch
and delayed articulation of the constitutional doctrine for which the case now
stands. Aside from the rather nice question presented by the procedural issue,
more fundamentally, it emphasizes the legal pitfalls which any journalist may
encounter when he or she ventures away from home in search of a story.
In February, 1977 Buzz Hirsch went to Oklahoma City to shepard through the
Oklahoma State District Court, a contract with William Silkwood, Karen's

father and the administrator of her estate, granting the exclusive rights to her
story to Hirsch's company. Unexpectedly, the negotiations were so drawn out
that Hirsch was required to remain in Oklahoma City long past the day he
expected to leave. While there, as part of his investigation of the Karen Silkwood
story, he attended a deposition of defendant Jacque Srouji. During the deposition, on February 26, 1977, he was served with the subpoena duces tecum which
triggered the entire litigation. Hirsch's attorneys in Los Angeles unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain a stipulation to move his deposition to Los Angeles, California, where Hirsch lived and worked. Failing that, on March 17, 1977, Hirsch filed
a Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum or, in the Alternative, to Transfer
the Deposition to the Central District of California, arguing that it was unreasonable and oppressive to require Hirsch to testify and produce documents
far from his home, office and attorneys and, in the alternative, that the Court
should fix Los Angeles, California as a "convenient place" for the deposition.
Had it not been for Hirsch's unexpected delay in returning to Los Angeles,
Kerr-McGee could not have forced Hirsch to travel to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and would have been required to take the deposition in Los Angeles, California. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c)(d) 45 (d)(2). It is unlikely that such a change would have
altered the ultimate decision in the case, but the cost and inconvenience to the
non-party journalist would have been far less.
United States District Judge Luther B. Eubanks denied Hirsch's Motion and
refused to transfer the deposition to Los Angeles, California. Word of that ruling
was received by telephone on Friday, March 25, 1977, with the deposition set to
commence the following Tuesday, March 29, 1977. On the first available court
day following the Court's ruling, March 28, 1977, Hirsch filed his Motion for
Protective Order and a Motion to Stay Deposition and Production of Documents
Pending Determination of Motion for Protective Order. Kerr-McGee's counsel
agreed to a postponement of the deposition for approximately two weeks in
order to file opposition to the Motion.
On April 8, 1977 the District Court denied the Motion for Protective Order.
Before reaching a decision on the main constitutional issue, the District Court
held, as a separate ground for denying the motion, that it was "untimely" under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it had not been combined with the
previous Motion to Quash or Transfer the Deposition. This threshold determination by the District Court threatened to prevent a decision on the ultimate First
Amendment issue and figured prominently in the opposition brief filed by KerrMcGee on appeal. The very first point argued in Kerr-McGee's "Brief of Appellees" was that the district court's procedural ruling was within his discretion
and should be affirmed.
This procedural obstacle provided the United States Court of Appeals with an
inviting means to avoid grappling with the serious constitutional issues involved
in the case.
Fortunately for the development of constitutional law, the court in Hirsch did
reach the critical First Amendment issue by holding that the district court had
abused its discretion in finding that the motion was "untimely".
This is consistent with the views that: "The exercise of discretion does not
permit the Court to disregard the substantive principles of law established for
the protection of litigants," Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 726 (6th Cir. 1942) and
that "Judicial discretion, as we understand it, is impartial reasoning, guided and
controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles requiring the court, in consideration of the facts and circumstances, to decide as its reason and conscience
dictate;. . ." Dixie Cup Co. v. Paper Container Manufacturing Co., 174 F.2d 834,
836 (7th Cir. 1949).
The opinion in Hirsch acknowledged that "undoubtedly, the trial court has
broad discretion in the area of discovery motions, but such an order in this area
is reversible nevertheless where an abuse of discretion is shown". 563 F.2d at
436. Similarly, the Court stated that "Unquestionably, it is desirable that all
motions which are going to be filed be filed at the same time and undoubtedly

Judge denied Hirsch's Motion for Protective Order and ruled
that Hirsch was not entitled to a privilege under the First
Amendment or Oklahoma statute, notwithstanding that arguthe rules contemplate this. However, in this instance, there were justifications
for not doing so." Id.
The Court noted that "when one seeks to transfer a case, it is the natural
course of things to withhold the motion, which goes to the merits of the issue,
until the transfer motion is determined." Id. The court was also sensitive to
Hirsch's concern whether "it would have been a waiver of his motions to transfer or to quash if he had filed a motion for a protective order at that time. Id.
Aside from these strategic considerations (which would have alone justified a
reversal on this procedural point), the Court of Appeals brought the importance
of the underlying constitutional issue to bear on the proper treatment to be
given to Hirsch's motion. The Court pointed out that "the protective order
particularly was seeking to protect a constitutional right and was a substantial
question. Perhaps the trial court could not so regard it. The claimed violations of
the first amendment to the Constitution demanded some evaluation of the
merits rather than disposing of it on the ground that it was not filed with the
motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum and the motion to transfer the cause
to California." Id. In concluding this aspect of the decision, the Court held that,
"Considering the importance of the question presented by the motion for protective order in relationship to the lack of magnitude of the problem of failure to
file simultaneous motions, it seems to us plain that the trial court should have
received the motion and considered it out of time."
The Supreme Court has often refused to permit procedural devices to prevent
full review of federal constitutional rights. Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320
(1958) (rejecting any "resort to an arid ritual of meaningless form"); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 421 (1965) (reviewing constitutional arguments in the
absence of required objections); see also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,455458 (1958). Because of "the vital importance of keeping open avenues of judicial
review of deprivations of constitutional rights," the Supreme Court has held
that it is "always preferable to litigate a matter when it is directly and principally in dispute" and that "it is better to eliminate the source of a potential legal
disability than to require the citizen to suffer the possibly unjustified consequences of the disability itself for an indefinite period of time before he can
secure adjudication of the state's right to impose it on the basis of some past
action." Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 52, 56-67 (1968); See also
Carasas v. LeVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,424 (1963).
The Court of Appeals implicitly recognized that it would have served no
useful purpose to affirm the District Court's decision on the narrow procedural
ground, after the primary constitutional issue had been exhaustively briefed
and argued, since it was apparent from the record that Hirsch would have again
been before the court in a subsequent proceeding urging the very same constitutional arguments.
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has singularly maintained the
view that a witness should not be forced to disobey a court order and appeal
from a subsequent adjudication of contempt in order to obtain a review of his
legal rights. "These non-party witnesses should not be required to expose themselves to the hazard of punishment in order to obtain a determination of their
claimed rights." Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 996-997 (10th
Cir.), cert. den. 380 U.S. 964 (1965). See also Saunders v. Great Western
Sugar Co., 396 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1968).

ably, a qualified privilege was developing. Hirsch appealed
from the decision of the District Court and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted a stay of all proceedings
by way of civil or criminal contempt or otherwise in connection
with the subpoena duces tecum and deposition pending appeal.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rendered a unanimous opinion in September, 1977 reversing the District Court's
denial of the Motion for Protective Order and remanding the
case for further proceedings.
The court posed the constitutional issue in Hirsch as follows:
The embattled issue is, therefore, whether the witness Hirsch is
entitled to legal protection against revealing information obtained by
him in the course of making a factual investigation of events surrounding the death of the decedent herein, Karen G. Silkwood, which

of a documentary film depicting
investigation looked to the making
162
the events before and after.

The decision subdivided this inquiry into three subsidiary
issues: 163
(1) (W)hether a privilege exists in favor of a nonparty witness
which permits him to resist pretrial discovery in order to protect a
confidential source of information.
(2) (W)hether, assuming that such a privilege does exist, it applies
to a person in the position of Hirsch.
(3) (I)f Hirsch has a privilege, how should the trial court proceed.

The Court tackled the second issue first and in answer to the
question whether the constitutional privilege is validly invoked
"where the reporter is not a regular newsman," concluded that
the First Amendment privilege was not limited in its scope to (a)
"a regular newsman" or "a salaried newspaper reporter" or (b)
any specific form of communication, such as newspaper reporting. In so doing, the Court established two important principles
applicable to this field of First Amendment law.
First, the Court refused to distinguish between a free lance or
independent journalist, on the one hand and a full-time, salaried
employee on the other. The Court disagreed with the District
Court's view that Hirsch was not entitled to be considered in the
protected class because he did not "regularly engage in obtaining, writing, reviewing, editing or otherwise preparing news."
The importance of this aspect of the Hirsch decision will be
seen when one realizes how many free lance writers, "stringers"
and other independent journalists, who are not regularly employed at a salary with a newspaper, magazine or news organization, have been guaranteed a constitutional right, regardless
162. 563 F.2d at 434.
163. Id. at 435-36.
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of the restrictive provisions of particular state shield laws, most
of which have been drawn in such a manner as to give little or
no protection to such free lance journalists.
Secondly, the Court refused to limit the application of the
constitutional privilege to "newspaper
reporting" or any
64
specified medium of communication.
Having established these twin foundations for its decision, the

Court quickly concluded that Hirsch, an independent filmmak1 65
er, qualified for the First Amendment privilege.

His mission in this case was to carry out investigative reporting for
use in the preparation of a documentary film. He is shown to have
spent considerable time and effort in obtaining facts and information
of the subject matter in this lawsuit, but it cannot be disputed that his
intention, at least, was to make use of this in preparation of the film.1M

The Court of Appeals had accepted Hirsch's sworn affidavit
to the effect that he had assured all of the witnesses whom he

interviewed that he was working for a production company in
164. The Court held that:
The Supreme Court has not limited the privilege to newspaper reporting. It has in fact held that the press comprehends different kinds of
publications which communicate to the public information and opinion.
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1935), and other cases recognize the presence of an underlying public interest in this communication
and particularly in maintaining it free in the public interest Id. at 437.
165. The Court was no doubt satisfied with the legitimacy of Hirsch's journalistic intentions from his background and experience. In 1969-70 Hirsch had
been a free lance reporter and had written articles for various newspapers
concerning the Chicago Seven trial. Hirsch later enrolled as a graduate student
in the Film Department at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA).
According to the record on appeal, Hirsch had been a reporter for the St.
Louis Post Dispatch and the St. Louis Globe Democrat and had covered the
Chicago Seven trial for the St. Louis Argus newspaper and the Mill Creek
Intelligentsia, a monthly publication the work for which conducting interviews
with Jerry Rubin and Rene Davis, two of the defendants at the highly publicized
trial.
The record on appeal indicates that Hirsch had written, directed and produced a short dramatic film which won seven awards in film festivals around
the country; had been named outstanding film student in 1972 at Columbia
College; and was selected as one of six students whose work was used for
instructional purposes for graduate students at UCLA.
166. The Court of Appeals noted the incongruity of Kerr-McGee belittling
Hirsch as a journalist while at the same time investing considerable resources in
forcing him to divulge what he had uncovered. "It strikes us as somewhat
anomalous that the appellee would argue that he is not a genuine reporter
entitled to the privilege, implying a lack of ability, while at the same time they
are making major legal effort to get hold of his material. They must believe that
it has promise for them in this lawsuit; otherwise, they would not be engaging in
an effort of some magnitude in order to obtain Hirsch's work product." 563 F.2d
433, 437.

395

an effort to make a factually accurate film and that he assured
the interviewees, who demanded confidentiality, that the information would be kept confidential and that he would respect the

requests of those who asked that their identities not be revealed.
Adopting an argument repeatedly voiced by journalists in
resisting compulsory disclosure of confidential information, the
Court of Appeals noted that Kerr-McGee was seeking "to take

personal advantage of Hirsch's efforts in obtaining his inves-

tigative work product,"' 167 but that Hirsch had "a legitimate in168
terest in seeking to protect the fruits of his labor.'
The Court initiated its discussion of the First Amendment

privilege by discussing the Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes. 69 Noting that the actual problem in that case was
"whether a reporter was free to avoid altogether a Grand Jury
subpoena,"'' 70 the Court in Hirsch frankly stated that the "ac-

tual decision of the Supreme Court is not surprising nor is it
important in the solution of our problem."' 7' However, the
Court found strong authority in Branzburg for its decision in
Hirsch.
But the Court's discussion in both the majority opinion of Justice
White and the concurring opinion of Justice Powell recognizing a
privilege which protects information given in confidence to a reporter
is important. The Court said that the First Amendment occupies a
preferred position in the Bill of Rights. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972); and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, reh. den., 404 U.S. 876
(1971). It was then careful to point out that any infringement of the
First Amendment must be held to a minimum-that it is to be no more
extensive then the necessities of the case. In re Stolar, 401 U.S.17223
(1971). The scope and breadth of the protection is fully discussed.

The Court, basing its conclusion on the majority opinion in

Branzburg, held that the Supreme Court was not requiring the
press to publish its sources of information or to indiscriminant167. 563 F.2d at 437.
168. Id.
169. 408 U.S. 661 (1972).
170. 563 F.2d at 437.
171. Id.
172. In a footnote, the court in Hirsch quotes the following from Branzburg:
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to
the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not
qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press would be eviscerated. But
these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior
restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or
implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold. No
exaction or tax for the privilege of publishing, and no penalty, civil or
criminal, related to the content of the published material is at issue here.
The use of confidential sources by the press is not forbidden or restricted; reporters remain free to seek news from any source by means within
the law. No attempt is made to require the press to publish its sources of
information or indiscriminantly to disclose them on request. 408 U.S.
661, 681-82.
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ly disclose them on request and that "the present privilege is no
longer in doubt. ' 173 Thus, Hirsch interpreted Branzburgto hold
that a reporter must respond to a subpoena and appear and
testify, but he may claim his constitutional privilege in relation
to particular questions which probe his sources.
The Court then reached the last aspect of its decision: how the
District Court should proceed in view of the presence of a First
Amendment issue. The Court cited the decision in Baker v. F. &
F. Investment, 74 for the rule that "The First Amendment considerations outweighed the need for the information which was
there sought" in a "fully reasoned opinion by Judge
17 5
Kaufman."
In developing the proper contours of a qualified first amendment privilege, the Court in Hirsch examined several prior decisions in which the balancing process had been addressed.
From the decision in Garlandv. Torre,'7 6 the Court extracted
a four pronged test as the criteria for solving the problem presented by the case at hand. Although in the Garland case, a
defendant (rather than a non-party) was ordered to disclose the
identity of a news source in a libel action, the Court in Hirsch
cited Garland as articulating the following tests which establish
the burden to be overcome before the production of confidential
1 77
sources can be compelled:
1. whether the party seeking information has independently attempted to obtain the information elsewhere and has been unsuccessful.
2. whether the information goes to the heart of the matter.
3. whether the information is of certain relevance.
4. the type of controversy.

From these criteria, the Court concluded that "compulsory
disclosure in the course of a 'fishing expedition' is ruled out in
' 78
the First Amendment case."'
173. 503 F.2d at 437.
174. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
175. 563 F.2d at 438.
176. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
177. 563 F.2d at 438.
178. Ironically, Kerr-McGee boldly stated that "If Kerr-McGee can be said to
be on a fishing expedition, then it appears that Kerr-McGee has hooked a
marlin". Record on Appeal, p. 132.

As between the approach in Baker and in Garland,the Court
in Hirsch chose to follow the former which it found "more
protective of rights under the First Amendment"' 79 because
Baker emphasized that the type of civil action, the compelling
necessity for obtaining the information and the degree of relevance were significant.
80
The Court also reviewed the decisions in Cervantes v. Time1
and Carey v. Hume.'8 ' In Cervantes, the Court noted that there
was a denial of "disclosure of a source of news in a defamation
case where the demand for the information was vague and not
shown to be consequential. ' 182 In Carey, the Court pointed out
that the defendant newsman was compelled to reveal certain
information by weighing "the need for testimony against the
claim of the newsman that the public's right to know is impaired.' ' 8 3 It was critical that the purported testimony was that
of eye witnesses who saw documents removed by the principals
in the case, who later complained that there had been a burglary
of the documents.
Applying the four criteria and the analysis of these prior
decisions to the instant case, the Court in Hirsch found that:
there has been a failure to weigh the various factors which have been
announced in the cases. Indeed it has been impossible to conduct any
weighing process because the record does not disclose anything as to
the nature of the evidence sought, as to the necessity for appellee to
have it,1 8and
as to its relevance, all of which are highly important
4
criteria.

Because of the lack of evidence in the record and the consequent failure to evaluate it the Court felt compelled to reverse
the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
Having set forth the specific criteria to be applied in judging
whether the qualified First Amendment privilege would be sustained, the Court went on to empower the District Court to
compel the parties to catalog:
In the case of appellee, the evidence that it is seeking to the extent of
its knowledge plus a showing of its efforts to obtain the information
from other sources; in the case of appellant, a description which does
not reveal information which is claimed to be privileged of the various
documents and a description of the witnesses interviewed sufficient to
permit the court to carry out a weighing process in accordance with
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the decisions above decided. Once the parties have done their work,
the trial court can come to grips with the merits.'85

Qualifying the First Amendment privilege by permitting
compulsory disclosure upon the satisfaction by the moving party of certain threshold requirements was first articulated in the
amicus curiae brief submitted by the New York Times in Branzto require
burg v. Hayes.18 6 The brief urged the Supreme Court
87
a moving party to meet the following three tests:
(1) Probable cause to believe the reporter possesses information
relevant to a crime;
(2) The information cannot be obtained by the government by alternative means; and
(3) The government must demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information.

The dissent of Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan
188
and Marshall, adopted a similar three test requirement:
(1) The government must show that there is probable cause to
believe that the newsman has information which is clearly relevant to
a specific violation of the law;
(2) The government must demonstrate that the information sought
cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and
(3) The government must demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information.

But Justice Douglas' strong dissent rejected any qualifications on the constitutional right to protect confidential sources
of information.
My belief is that all of the 'balancing' was done by those who wrote the
Bill of Rights. By casting the First Amendment in absolute terms, they
185. Id. Kerr-McGee did not seek review before the Supreme Court and to
date has not re-instituted proceedings in the District Court.
186. 408 U.S. 661 (1972).
187. Brief for New York Times as amicus curiae at 29, Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 666 (1972).
188. Id. at 740. Justice Steward viewed these special safeguards as necessary
to protect "delicate and vulnerable" First Amendment rights because "The
reporters' constitutional right to a confidential relationship with his source
stems from the broad social interest in a full and free flow of information to the
public." Id. at 725. Justice Stewart's dissent has not gone unnoticed. For example, in 1974 when the Oklahoma privilege statute was enacted, it was provided
that protection could be lost only if "the court finds that the party seeking the
information or identity has established by clear and convincing evidence that
such information or identity is irrelevant to a significant issue in the action and
cannot be obtained by alternate means." OKLA. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 385.1
(Supp. 1977).

repudiated the timid, watered-down, emasculated versions of the First
Amendment which both
the Government and the New York Times
189
advance in this case.

Justice Douglas concluded that:
Today's decision will impede the wide-open and robust and dissemination of ideas and counter-thought which a free press both fosters
and protects and which is essential to the success of intelligent selfgovernment. Forcing a reporter before a grand jury will have two
retarding effects upon the ear and the pen of the press. Fear of exposure will cause dissidents to communicate less openly to trusted reporters. And, fear of accountability will cause editors and critics to write
with more restrained pens. 190

The roadmap described by the Court represents the most
explicit analysis of the qualified nature of the first amendment
privilege to date. The four tests established by the Court and
elaborated in its subsequent discussion, leave no doubt that
while confidential information cannot be compelled merely for
the asking, it is not absolutely protected. This approach is
consistent with Branzburg,Baker, and each of the federal decisions which have dealt with the question. The growing line of
cases establishing the qualified First Amendment privilege
have thus served the salutory purpose of assuring journalists
that a substantial burden of proof must be overcome before the
production of confidential information can be compelled. But
the price for this protection has been the unanimous rejection of
any absolute First Amendment privilege.
In giving some, but not all of the protection sought by the
press, the Hirsch decision (and its predecessors) have necessarily left the door open to some compulsory disclosure of confidential information provided the strict requirements, carefully
summarized in Hirsch, are established to the satisfaction of the
courts. This will doubtless involve journalists in time consuming and expensive litigation involving evidentiary hearings and
potentially in-camera review of documents and information followed by appeals and possible contempt proceedings. But this is
surely preferable to the indiscriminant production of confidential information on demand.
CONCLUSION

The Hirsch decision represents the most recent confirmation
of a qualified First Amendment privilege protecting confidential sources of information and it is the first case to place filmmakers on a par with newspapermen and broadcast journalists
with respect to such protection. It comes at an opportune time
189. 408 U.S. 661, 713.
190. Id. at 720-21.
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when screenwriters and producers are increasingly using
theatrical and television motion pictures to chronicle the people
and events of our time.
Despite the favorable result, the Hirsch decision, which was
not achieved without complex litigation and the ever-present
threat of contempt and jail, is a sobering reminder of the critical
need for uniform federal legislation protecting the confidential
sources of information of all journalists, regardless of the
medium by which they choose to communicate to the public.

APPENDIX A
Policy With Regard to the Issuance of Subpoenas To, And the Interrogation,
Indictment, or Arrest of, Members of The News Media. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976).
Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of reporters
to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power of the government
should not be used in such a way that it impairs a reporter's responsibility to
cover as broadly as possible controversial public issues. In balancing the
concern that the Department of Justice has for the work of the news media and
the Department's obligation to the fair administration of justice, the following
guidelines shall be adhered to by all members of the Department:
(a) In
determining whether to request issuance of a subpoena to the news media, the
approach in every case must be to strike the proper balance between the public's interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the public's
interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice.
(b) All reasonable attempts should be made to obtain information from nonmedia sources before there is any consideration of subpoenaing a representative of the news media. (c) Negotiations with the media shall be pursued in all
cases in which a subpoena is contemplated. These negotiations should attempt
to accommodate the interests of the trial or grand jury with the interests of the
media. Where the nature of the investigation permits, the government should
make clear what its needs are in a particular case as well as its willingness to
respond to particular problems of the media.
(d) If negotiations fail, no
Justice Department official shall request, or make arrangements for, a subpoena to any member of the news media without the express authorization of the
Attorney General. If a subpoena is obtained without authorization, the Department will-as a matter of course-move to quash the subpoena without prejudice to its rights subsequently to request the subpoena upon the proper authorization. (3) In requesting the Attorney General's authorization for a subpoena, the following principles will apply:
(1) There should be reasonable ground based on information obtained from non-media sources that a crime has occurred.
(2) There should be reasonable ground to believe that the information sought is essential to a successful investigation-particularly with
reference to directly establishing guilt or innocence. The subpoena
should not be used to obtain peripheral, non-essential or speculative
information.
(3) The government should have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
the information from alternative nonmedia sources.
(4) The use of subpoenas to members of the news media should,
except under exigent circumstances, be limited to the verification of
published information and to such surrounding circumstances as relate
to the accuracy of the published information.
(5) Even subpoena authorization requests for publicly disclosed information should be treated with care to avoid claims of harassment.
(6) Subpoenas should, wherever possible, be directed at material
information regarding a limited subject matter, should cover a reasonably limited period of time, and should avoid requiring production of a
large volume of unpublished material. They should give reasonable and
timely notice of the demand for documents.

